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(1) 
LEFT IN THE RAIN WITHOUT AN UMBRELLA: HOW DOE v. BROWN 
UNIVERSITY LEAVES NONSTUDENTS UNSHELTERED BY FEDERAL 
TITLE IX PROTECTIONS 
EMILY S. BLEY* 
“Rain does not fall on one roof alone.”1 
I. THE PERFECT STORM: AN INTRODUCTION TO TITLE IX 
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX) has been a 
lightning rod for controversy since it first emerged decades ago as a means for 
women to enter the world of college sports.2  The Act has significantly evolved 
from its origins in the athletic realm; today, Title IX is arguably better known for 
the protection it provides to sexual assault survivors than the equality it 
establishes in university locker rooms.3  Though instances of sexual misconduct 
are no more frequent in our contemporary society than at the time of Title IX’s 
passage, the issue of sexual misconduct has certainly achieved greater visibility 
in recent years.4  Public reports of alleged sexual harassment and the filing of 
formal legal complaints against offenders, have been central topics of discussion 
 
*   J.D. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A., 2017, 
Saint Louis University. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Joseph and Susan, as well as my 
sisters, Ellen, Erica, and Elyse, who have given me so much love and support over the years. I 
would also like to thank the staff of the Villanova Law Review for providing thoughtful feedback 
throughout the writing and publication of this note. 
1.  Cameroonian proverb, WISE OLD SAYINGS, http://www.wiseoldsayings.com/rain-
quotes/ [https://perma.cc/89JP-JS9D] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).  
2.  See Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer 
Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 99 (2010) (explaining Title IX is best known 
for role in expanding women’s sports at high school and collegiate levels). 
3.  See generally Know Your Rights: Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Under Title 
IX, AM. ASS’N U. WOMEN, https://www.aauw.org/what-we-do/legal-resources/know-your-
rights-on-campus/campus-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/A2HF-M6H5](last visited Oct. 4, 
2018) (answering frequently asked questions about Title IX rights); Title IX, END RAPE ON 
CAMPUS, http://endrapeoncampus.org/title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/Y3LJ-WVTQ] (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018) (listing resources available to students under Title IX); Title IX, RAPE ABUSE AND 
INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/articles/title-ix (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) 
(explaining available enforcement mechanisms under Title IX); Title IX and Sexual Assault, 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/title-ix-and-sexual-
assault (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (describing student rights under Title IX after sexual assault 
occurs). 
4.  See Ann Jones, Sexual Harassment Has Not Changed So Much Since the 1970s, THE 
NATION (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/sexual-harassment-has-not-
changed-so-much-since-the-1970s/ [https://perma.cc/EQK3-ZU4S] (detailing author’s own 
experiences with sexual harassment throughout the 1960s and 70s, as well as multiple stories 
of sexual misconduct affecting other women).  Jones noted that during the recent #MeToo 
movement, some commentators grossly underestimated the universality of sexual harassment 
toward women in the past few decades.  See id.  In Jones’s words, “None of this is new, though 
we tend to act as if it were . . . for instance, I heard three young women radio reporters explain 
that women back in the 1970s or 1980s accepted ‘unwanted male attention’ in the office and in 
life ‘because that’s just the way things were.’”  See id. 
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in current news and pop culture.5  Society has increasingly scrutinized colleges 
and universities, in particular, to pursue sexual assault allegations with focused 
consistency and increased aggression.6  Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the 
burgeoning #MeToo movement and the looming threat of more relaxed federal 
guidance by the current administration, the future of Title IX is conflicted and 
uncertain.7  Despite the political rhetoric swirling around its fate, Title IX has 
long been hailed as an instrument of gender equality and a pillar of justice for 
assault survivors.8  Yet most Americans may be surprised to know that Title IX’s 
protections are curiously restrictive for such a liberally-construed statute.9 
Under federal guidelines mandated by Title IX, an educational institution 
that receives government funding is required to investigate, adjudicate, and report 
 
5.  See Slate Staff, The Best of the Reckoning, SLATE (Dec. 21, 2017, 4:12 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2017/12/the_best_writing_on_sexual_harass
ment_this_year.html [https://perma.cc/6G7A-RXEV] (archiving and praising many articles 
written about sexual misconduct claims and formal legal complaints in 2017). 
6.  See RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011) (instructing every college that receives federal money to 
comply with more aggressive Title IX standards: to use the lowest possible standard of proof—
preponderance of the evidence—in sexual assault causes, in addition to allowing accusers to 
appeal not-guilty findings, accelerate their adjudication processes, and strongly discouraged the 
cross-examination of accusers); see also KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, The Path to Obama’s 
‘Dear Colleague’ Letter, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/31/the-path-to-
obamas-dear-colleague-letter/?utm_term=.978f289cbffb [https://perma.cc/Y6LL-2F6J] 
(discussing political motivations and origins of Department of Education’s new federal mandate 
in 2011).  
7.  See History & Vision, ME TOO., https://metoomvmt.org/about/#history 
[https://perma.cc/H4XQ-SJQF] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) (“The ‘me too.’ movement was 
founded in 2006 to help survivors of sexual violence, particularly . . . young women of color 
from low wealth communities, find pathways to healing . . . .  In less than six months, because 
of the viral #metoo hashtag, a vital conversation about sexual violence has been thrust into the 
national dialogue.”); see also Emily Yoffe, Reining in the Excesses of Title IX, THE ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 4, 2018), www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/title-ix-reforms-are-
overdue/569215/ [https://perma.cc/J2GP-UHY7] (explaining current Secretary of Education 
Betsy DeVos is on verge of announcing new Title IX guidelines, which would narrow definition 
of sexual misconduct, and lower school officials’ expected knowledge and awareness of sexual 
misconduct on campuses).  
8.  See Valerie Jarrett, 40th Anniversary of Title IX, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 21, 2012, 
6:36 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/06/21/40th-anniversary-title-ix 
[https://perma.cc/WH6R-N6FZ] (“Title IX matters.  And it is just as important today as when 
it was first passed forty years ago.  Title IX bans sex discrimination against girls-and boys-in 
all programs at schools around the country.  From addressing inequality in math and science 
education, to ensuring dormitories are safe, to preventing sexual assault on campus, to fairly 
funding athletic programs, Title IX ensures equality for our young people in every aspect of 
their education.”). 
9.  See Walker, supra note 2, at 110 (“Although Davis was technically a victory for sexual 
assault survivors . . . Title IX advocates feared that the Supreme Court had established an 
impossibly high bar for recovery.  The doctrinal test of cases involving allegations of rape or 
sexual assault on college campuses now has four components . . . .”).  See, e.g., Doe v. Brown 
Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D.R.I. 2017) (limiting private Title IX remedies to students 
and employees at offending institution, only), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).  For a 
discussion of the current elements required by federal law necessary to successfully claim a 
Title IX violation see infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. 
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instances of gender-based discrimination and sexual violence.10  Essentially, a 
publicly-funded school has a statutory duty under Title IX to ensure that 
educational opportunities remain untainted by sexual misconduct.11  Should a 
school fail to meet the requisite outlined standards for managing Title IX claims, 
it not only risks financial punishment by the federal government, but also exposes 
itself to a private right of action by the injured person.12 
The educational institutions in the United States that receive federal funding 
under Title IX, especially colleges and universities, often serve a community far 
beyond the students enrolled in their classes and living on their campuses.13  
These schools not only provide educational opportunities for their own students, 
but they also host a variety of sporting events, artistic performances, speaking 
engagements, and traditional celebrations for nonstudents.14  In addition to a 
 
10.  See Scope of Title IX, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/N6FE-GD47] (last 
modified Sept. 25, 2018) (discussing the scope of Title IX and sex discrimination).  The 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has stated:  
Title IX applies to institutions that receive federal financial assistance from [the 
Department of Education], including state and local educational agencies. These 
agencies include approximately 16,500 local school districts, 7,000 postsecondary 
institutions, as well as charter schools, for-profit schools, libraries, and museums. 
Also included are vocational rehabilitation agencies and education agencies of 50 
states, the District of Columbia, and territories and possessions of the United States. 
Id. 
11.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018) (imposing duty on publicly-funded institutions to 
protect program participants from sexual discrimination); see also Annette Thacker, Helping 
Students Who Can’t Help Themselves: Special Education and the Deliberate Indifference 
Standard for Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment, 2011 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 701, 701–02 (2011) 
(discussing how Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX as duty on part of educational 
institutions to ensure student’s opportunity to receive an education is not hindered by unwanted 
sexual misconduct).  
12.  See Walker, supra note 2, at 102, 105–06 (discussing recognition of not only 
administrative enforcement mechanisms under Title IX, but also implied private right of action). 
13.  See, e.g., Library Use Policy, FALVEY MEMORIAL LIBRARY, 
https://library.villanova.edu/using-the-library/access/library-use-policy 
[https://perma.cc/8CF9-BB7X] (last visited May 4, 2019) (“Visitors not affiliated with 
Villanova University may use the Library during visitor hours of Monday-Friday, 9 a.m. – 5 
p.m., and will be asked to register at the main library entrance desk and present a photo 
identification card.”); Service and Social Justice, VILLANOVA U. MISSION & MINISTRY, 
https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/mission/campusministry/service.html 
[https://perma.cc/G76X-RDBA] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (providing various links for 
student opportunities to advocate and volunteer, get involved in local Philadelphia community, 
and participate in service and social justice); Nova Bucks Accepted Here, VILLANOVA U. UNIT, 
https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/unit/wildcard/accepted.html [https://perma.cc/BV4E-
WPSP] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (listing convenience stores, restaurants, grocery stores, 
salons, and other private establishments that solicit local business from Villanova students via 
internal currency system operated by Villanova University). 
14.  See Blake Gumprecht, The American College Town, 93 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 51, 
59–61 (2003) (noting most colleges and universities offer programming that appeals to students 
and also surrounding community members and visitors from around country and world).  
Gumprecht noted that the typical American college campus operates as a public space just as 
much as it operates as a learning environment.  See id. at 59.  It is a distinctly American notion 
that higher education should be a comprehensive experience that extends beyond the classroom.  
See id.  This outward-looking view of education in college and universities is what motivates 
schools to “spend millions of dollars to maintain their campuses and provide a range of activities 
3
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variety of public programming, these institutions offer tours and events for 
enrolled students’ families, visiting students, alumni, and local residents.15  The 
accessible and central nature of colleges and universities make them a magnet for 
academic debate, community organization, and socialization.16  In fact, a single 
limited geographic area, such as a college town or major U.S. city, may host 
multiple educational institutions.17  The central and social nature of college 
campuses make their boundaries as inexact as they are permeable.18  These 
schools do not exist in quiet isolation, but are in constant flux; they are connected 
by a common community as well as a continuous flow of visitors.19 
Yet, while enrolled students may be able to take shelter under the umbrella 
of protection provided by Title IX, that same canopy of security does not extend 
to any innocent nonstudent who happens to pass through the same storm of 
 
for students, staff, and people with no direct connection to the educational institution.”  See id.   
15.  See id. at 69 (“On a half-dozen weekends every autumn, [Auburn, Alabama] is 
transformed.  Auburn’s football stadium holds 86,063 people, twice as many as live in the city.  
Visitors who attend games spend an estimated $31.7 million annually.”); see also 2017 National 
College Football Attendance Report, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (NCAA), 
fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/football_records/Attendance/2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4USB-S6XX] 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (reporting that in 2017, Michigan State, Ohio State, Penn State, and 
the University of Alabama had an average attendance of over 100,000 individuals at each home 
football game).   
16.  See Gumprecht, supra note 14, at 59 (noting concept of publicly accessible college 
campuses is American invention).  When discussing the phenomena of the American campus 
existing as a both a private and public space, Gumprecht commented: 
In many ways the campus is the center of life in the college town, much as the central 
business district was in the pre-automobile city or the shopping mall is in suburbia.  
With their residential areas, restaurants and bookstores, recreational facilities, 
concert halls, sports stadiums, landscaped grounds, and full calendars of events, 
campuses often function like self-contained cities. They are centers of culture.  They 
are entertainment districts.  They act as parks and historic sites.  They have symbolic 
and public relations importance.  They are a hub of activities that serve not only 
students and staff but also the larger population of the town and region.  As such, the 
campus serves both as an environment for learning and as a public space.  
Id. 
17.  See, e.g., Philadelphia, PA Colleges & Universities, AREAVIBES.COM, 
https://www.areavibes.com/philadelphia-pa/colleges/ [https://perma.cc/AQA4-Z63C] (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2018) (displaying map of all colleges and universities in Philadelphia urban 
and suburban area, including twenty four-year institutions and eighteen more institutions that 
grant junior degrees in various skills and vocations).  
18.  See supra notes 13–17 (demonstrating that college campuses are not only engaged 
in community outreach with members of public and local communities, but also packed close 
together in common geographic area, making campus boundaries less defined than perhaps 
purported to be). 
19.  See Gumprecht, supra note 14, at 59–60 (discussing University of Oklahoma in 
Norman, Oklahoma as a typical example of a U.S. higher educational institution spending and 
investing significant capital to provide range of activities for students, staff, and those with no 
direct connection to the school).  Gumprecht further notes that the inclusion of certain facilities 
in the very construction of modern colleges and universities is indicative of the multifaceted 
role schools play in their respective communities.  See id. at 59.  The University of Oklahoma’s 
campus is a prime example of an institution that serves both its students and the public; the 
2,000-acre property features parks, an eighteen-hole golf course, a public swimming pool, 
conference facilities, a hotel, an airport, as well as restaurants and bars.  See id.  The school also 
owns two art museums, which feature rotating exhibits, and draws millions of people every year 
to campus for sporting events.  See id.  
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assault, harassment, or discrimination.20  In a recent decision, the United States 
District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that guests, visitors, and 
prospective students who suffer on-campus sexual misconduct are not owed any 
federal protections under Title IX.21  In other words, there is currently no private 
remedy available under Title IX for nonstudents who are discriminated against, 
harassed, or assaulted on college campuses by students of that school.22 
Generally, the past few decades of federal case law regarding private rights 
of action under Title IX indicate that the statute’s protection is limited to students 
who attend the offending school.23  Before August 2017, only one case addressed 
whether nonstudents have standing to bring a private Title IX action against a 
college or university they do not attend.24  In K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College,25 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit effectively sidestepped 
the question of nonstudent standing for Title IX claims.26  Instead, it dismissed 
the suit by deciding that the nonstudent-plaintiff could not prove the requisite 
elements of a Title IX claim.27 
 
20.  See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D.R.I. 2017) (“The total absence 
of a relationship between Ms. Doe’s educational institution (Providence College) and the 
harassers’ school (Brown University) is dispositive on the issue of whether Ms. Doe has a Title 
IX claim against Brown in this case.  Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Doe has not alleged 
that she was denied equal access to education as required for a Title IX claim to exist.”), aff’d, 
896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018). 
21.  See id. at 563 (“Finding that Ms. Doe’s status as a non-student, regardless of her 
allegations that the Court accepts as true, removes her from Title IX’s private-cause-of-action 
umbrella of protection, the Court need go no further in its analysis of that claim.”). 
22.  See id. at 562 (explaining Jane Doe was not student at Brown University and 
therefore its actions, or the lack thereof, could not have prevented her from attaining education 
in environment free of hostility or misconduct).  As a result of the Doe decision, nonstudents 
have no recourse under Title IX against a school that has failed to properly investigate, 
adjudicate, or report an incident of sexual nature involving them, even if the incident happened 
on their campus.  See id.  The District Court of Rhode Island further justified its holding by 
explaining that the total absence of a relationship between Jane Doe and the programs and 
services provided by Brown University cannot support claim of denial of equal access to 
education, since Jane Doe had no access to Brown University in first instance.  See id. 
23.  See generally Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 
632 (1999) (involving student who sued school after suffering sexual harassment at the hands 
of another student); Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 278–79 (1998) 
(involving student who sued school after engaging in sexual relations with teacher, alleging that 
she was harassed in violation of Title IX); Roe v. Saint Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 878–80 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (involving college student who sued university after sexual assaulted by fraternity 
member); Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 70–72 (1st Cir. 2007) (involving student 
who sued school after experiencing sexually inappropriate behavior by another student); Frazier 
v. Fairhaven, 276 F.3d 52, 65 (1st Cir. 2002) (involving student who sued school after harassed 
in bathroom). 
24.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The parties 
dispute whether K.T.’s status as a non-student precludes her from asserting a Title IX 
harassment claim.”). 
25.  865 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017). 
26.  See id. at 1057 (finding K.T.’s suit had no merit because complaint failed to state 
plausible claim regarding proving deliberate indifference and actual knowledge on behalf of 
school administrators necessary in order to survive dismissal). 
27.  See id. at 1058 (“Thus, while K.T. was dissatisfied with Culver-Stockton’s response, 
based on the allegations in the complaint the response cannot be characterized as deliberate 
indifference that caused the assault.” (alteration in original)). 
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Only a month later in Doe v. Brown University,28 the District Court of Rhode 
Island contemplated the same question the Eighth Circuit declined to answer: 
whether nonstudents may bring a Title IX claim against a college or university 
they do not attend.29  The court, looking to the legislative history and statutory 
language of Title IX, ultimately issued a blanket denial to all nonstudents seeking 
Title IX claims against schools they do not attend.30  In doing so, the court closed 
a legal door the Eighth Circuit had left open for nonstudents.31  Under the ruling 
in K.T., if a nonstudent could demonstrate the requisite elements of a Title IX 
claim, then regardless of enrollment status, that nonstudent could potentially 
recover.32  Under the District Court of Rhode Island’s holding in Doe, if 
nonstudents are assaulted on a college campus, they are absolutely barred from 
bringing a Title IX claim against the offending school, regardless of the merits of 
the claim.33 
 
28.  270 F. Supp. 3d 556 (D.R.I. 2017), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018). 
29.  See id. at 560 (explaining that Jane Doe must prove most basic criteria of Title IX 
claim: that she is member of class of persons entitled to Title IX protection). 
30.  See id. at 561 (explaining that statutory language and legislative history of Act shows 
that enforcing Title IX against educational institution was meant to be program specific, mostly 
evidenced by fact that financial penalties were applied to specific program where violation 
occurred); accord Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127, 133 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower 
court’s decision to preclude Jane Doe from Title IX recovery because she did not participate in 
Brown University’s educational programs).  Although the First Circuit affirmed the District 
Court of Rhode Island’s ruling in Doe, a footnote in its opinion sets forth an important caveat 
to its decision: 
We clarify, though, that a victim does not need to be an enrolled student at the 
offending institution in order for a Title IX private right of action to exist.  Members 
of the public regularly avail themselves of the services provided by educational 
institutions receiving federal funding.  For example, they regularly access university 
libraries, computer labs, and vocational resources and attend campus tours, public 
lectures, sporting events, and other activities at covered institutions.  In any of those 
instances, the members of the public are either taking part or trying to take part of a 
funding recipient institution’s educational program or activity.  In the case before us, 
however, Doe failed to allege that she had availed herself of any of Brown 
University’s educational programs in the past or that she intended to do so in the 
future.  She did not plead that Brown University’s alleged deliberate indifference to 
it prevented her from accessing such resources at Brown. 
Id. at 132, n.6.  This pronouncement by the First Circuit alters the district court’s blanket 
preclusion of recovery for nonstudents under Title IX by focusing on the degree of participation 
in the institution’s educational programs, rather than the enrollment status of the plaintiff.  See 
id. 
31.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (agreeing with Eastern District Court of Missouri’s 
previous reasoning in K.T., where it held that nonstudents do not suffer systemic effect on 
educational programs or activities at school that they do not attend).  For a further discussion 
regarding the implications of the Doe decision, and how the Eighth Circuit’s silence on 
nonstudent standing differs from the blanket denial of nonstudent standing see infra notes 160–
79 and accompanying text.  
32.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[K.T.’s] 
complaint identified no causal nexus between Culver-Stockton’s inaction and K.T.’s 
experiencing sexual harassment . . . . [t]he complaint does not, however, allege that Culver-
Stockton’s purported indifference ‘subject[ed] [K.T.] to harassment.’” (quoting Davis ex rel. 
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999))). 
33.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (holding that because Jane Doe was not enrolled at 
Brown University, she cannot properly allege she was denied equal access to receiving 
education there, as required for Title IX claim to stand). 
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This Note analyzes the District Court of Rhode Island’s recent decision in 
Doe to categorically exclude nonstudents from the class of persons able to bring 
Title IX claims against educational institutions.34  This Note will further advocate 
for courts to abandon the rules established in Doe in favor of a less-restrictive 
application of Title IX, because the implications of the Doe decision are not only 
inconsistent with the overall purpose of Title IX, but also jeopardize the health 
and safety of students and the greater college community.35  Part II provides 
information regarding the judicial expansion of Title IX over the past forty 
years.36  Part III provides the facts and procedure of Doe.37  Part IV discusses the 
court’s reasoning in deciding Doe.38  Part V critically evaluates the flaws in the 
Doe decision and advocates for the adoption of a less-restrictive application of 
Title IX for nonstudents.39  Finally, this Note concludes in Part VI, which 
discusses the impact of the Doe.40 
II. LIGHTNING STRIKES AND THUNDER FOLLOWS: THE ORIGINS OF TITLE IX 
Though Title IX has long been at the center of the gender equality movement 
in collegiate athletics, its modern emergence as a vehicle of protection for sexual 
assault survivors is rooted in decades of judicial expansion.41  In particular, the 
Supreme Court of the United States' formal establishment of the peer-harassment 
doctrine signified a seismic shift in the application of Title IX on college 
campuses.42  Now nonstudents are invoking the historically broad nature of Title 
IX’s past judicial interpretation to widen the scope of recovery.43 
 
34.  See id. at 558 (finding expansion Jane Doe advocated for in class of persons able to 
bring private Title IX claims is not permitted under Title IX or in past cases interpreting 
language of statute). 
35.  For a complete argument advocating for the abandonment of the absolute exclusion 
of nonstudents from bringing Title IX claims in Doe, see infra notes 160–79 and accompanying 
text. 
36.  For a further discussion of the judicial history of Title IX, see infra notes 41–101 and 
accompanying text. 
37.  For a further discussion of the facts of Doe, see infra notes 102–18 and 
accompanying text. 
38.  For an analysis of the court’s reasoning and decision in Doe, see infra notes 119–38 
and accompanying text. 
39.  For a complete critical analysis of the decision in Doe in light of the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in K.T., see infra notes 139–79 and accompanying text. 
 40.  For a complete critical analysis of the decision in Doe in light of the Eighth Circuit’s 
dec 
ision in K.T., see infra notes 139–79 and accompanying text.   
 41. See Walker, supra note 2, at 99 (explaining evolution of Title IX from gender equality 
statute for college sports to complex mechanism of protection for sexual assault survivors). 
42.  See infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the peer-harassment 
doctrine from Davis and the introduction of the deliberate indifference standard.  
43.  See generally Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (D.R.I. 2017) (holding 
that nonstudent does not have standing under Title IX to bring peer harassment claim), aff’d, 
896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018); K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 
2017) (involving nonstudent-plaintiff seeking to bring peer-harassment claim under Title IX). 
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A. Clouds on the Horizon: The Evolution of Title IX 
Title IX has undergone extensive change in the realm of gender equality 
since its inception in the 1970s.44  Title IX provides that, “[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”45  Although 
athletics are not explicitly mentioned in its statutory language, the unspoken 
implications of Title IX required schools to offer equal opportunities for women 
to play sports, as well as provide women with the same athletic facilities and 
funds as men.46  The passage of Title IX, according to the legislators who drafted 
and advocated for the Act, directly targeted several kinds of discrimination that 
plagued educational institutions across the country.47  Though the use of Title IX 
to achieve equality for women’s collegiate athletics was groundbreaking, the 
untapped transformative potential of Title IX took decades to come into 
realization.48 
Congress originally devised Title IX as a means of achieving institutional 
compliance through a monetary-based incentive system.49  Within the 
 
44.  See Walker, supra note 2, at 99 (“The focus on sports has limited the transformative 
power of Title IX’s non-discrimination mandate.  Not every woman plays sports, but a rape-
tolerant campus—with ineffective prevention programming, inadequate support services for 
survivors, and inequitable grievance procedures—threatens every student.”). 
45.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
46.  Christine Hepler, A Bibliography of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2013) (“Prior to the passage of Title IX, 170,000 men 
participated in intercollegiate athletics.  During the same time, only 30,000 women were 
involved in intercollegiate athletics.  By the Thirtieth Anniversary of the passage of Title IX, 
209,000 men and 151,000 women participated in athletics at the college level.”).  
47.  See 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh) (“We are dealing with 
discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies 
within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment within an 
institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever.”); see also Hepler, supra note 46, at 447–48 
(noting that aside from Senator Bayh, who was most prominent proponent of gender equality 
under Title IX in Senate, Title IX was supported by two female Democratic representatives in 
House: Edith Green from Oregon and Patsy Mink from Hawaii). 
48.  See Hepler, supra note 46, at 442–45 (detailing general pre-enactment history of 
Title IX and statistical evidence of improvements to gender equality in undergraduate athletic 
programs).  
49.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL, 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix [INSERT PERMALINK HERE] (last modified Aug. 6, 
2015) (outlining procedures for terminating federal funding if program found noncompliant 
with Title IX).  The Title IX Legal Manual states: 
Agency staff should remember that the primary means of enforcing compliance with 
Title IX is through voluntary agreements with the recipients, and that fund 
suspension or termination is a means of last resort. . . .  Several procedural 
requirements must be satisfied before an agency may deny or terminate federal funds 
to an applicant/recipient.  A four step process is involved: 1) the agency must notify 
the recipient that it is not in compliance with the statute and that voluntary 
compliance cannot be achieved; 2) after an opportunity for a hearing on the record, 
the “responsible Department official” must make an express finding of failure to 
comply; 3) the head of the agency must approve the decision to suspend or terminate 
funds; and 4) the head of the agency must file a report with the House and Senate 
legislative committees having jurisdiction over the programs involved and wait 30 
8
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Department of Education, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) retains primary 
enforcement authority over Title IX claims.50  Either in response to student 
complaints or on its own initiative, the OCR may conduct Title IX compliance 
reviews at schools that receive federal funding.51  If the OCR determines a school 
violated Title IX standards, then the OCR has the power to terminate that school’s 
federal funding.52  Still, the resolution offered by the OCR for institutional 
transgressions is limited to its administrative impact; in reality, it has little to no 
effect on the students who suffered injury because of a school’s failure to 
investigate, adjudicate, and report their assault.53  Just a few years after Congress 
passed Title IX, the Supreme Court recognized the shortcomings in the OCR’s 
ability to provide that effective relief and expanded the method of recovery 
 
days before terminating funds.  The report must provide the grounds for the decision 
to deny or terminate the funds to the recipient or applicant.  
Id. 
50.  See Walker, supra note 2, at 101–04 (describing OCR administrative method of 
redress in response to Title IX claim).  Though no official elemental process has been outlined 
by OCR to issue a Title IX complaint, a summary of scholarly analysis of OCR guidelines has 
produced the following standard:  
The purpose of filing a complaint with OCR is to trigger an investigation into the 
adequacy of a school’s response to peer sexual harassment.  The critical inquiry in 
OCR review is how quickly and effectively the school responded after receiving 
actual or constructive notice of harassment that impairs a student’s access to 
educational programs or activities . . . .  An OCR complaint should demonstrate: (1) 
impairment of access to educational opportunities, (2) actual or constructive notice, 
and (3) the inadequacy of the school’s response . . . . 
Id. at 102, 104.  Along with investigating institutional compliance with Title IX, the 
responsibility of the OCR is to issue periodic policy guidelines regarding adequate and 
reasonable responses by colleges and universities to filed complaints.  See id. at 102. 
51.  See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2018) (authorizes the Office of Civil Rights to oversee and 
ensure all applications for federal financial by program or institution that operations compliant 
with Title IX); see also OCR’s Enforcement of Title IX, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/WKY2-
NC36] (last modified Sept. 25, 2018) (“OCR evaluates, investigates, and resolves complaints 
alleging sex discrimination. OCR also conducts proactive investigations, called compliance 
reviews, to examine potential systemic violations based on sources of information other than 
complaints.”). 
52.  See supra note 50 (outlining method of terminating federal funding of noncompliant 
educational institutions); see also Walker, supra note 2, at 102 (explaining that while OCR has 
power to terminate federal funding, ultimate goal of OCR review is voluntary compliance).  
Walker pointed out that while OCR has the power to terminate federal financial assistance and 
pressure schools into voluntary compliance, “lackluster administrative enforcement [in the 
OCR] has often forced private litigants to seek vindication of their civil rights within a daunting 
doctrinal framework.”  See id.  Walker explained that Title IX complaints and OCR inquiries 
are theoretically supposed to be complementary modes of enforcement; schools should change 
their Title IX procedures in response to OCR sanctions, and then individuals should seek 
personal remedy for the wrongs suffered as a result of the discriminatory practices of those 
schools.  See id.  Unfortunately, as Walker discusses, there has been an increased reliance by 
Title IX claimants on private civil suits because of disorganization and uncertainty at OCR.  See 
id.  
53.  See Walker, supra note 2, at 102 (discussing how shortcomings with OCR 
enforcement, including recent pronounced inconsistencies in policy guidance, underscore 
importance of bringing private suits); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 704–06 
(1979) (noting that administrative remedy serves limited government policy ends and offers 
virtually no substantial redress to individuals impacted by failed compliance with Title IX). 
9
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available under the Act.54 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,55 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that an implied private right of action against an educational 
institution exists under Title IX.56  The Court allowed personal recovery under 
Title IX and reasoned that the right to bring an individual claim was consistent 
with the legislative intent of the Act.57  Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, 
identified two underlying principles upon which Title IX was founded.58  First, 
the government should avoid the use of federal resources to support 
discriminatory practices; second, it should protect individual citizens against 
those very practices.59  Though the administrative remedy already in place before 
 
54.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705–06 (pointing out that standards for making formal 
complaint with OCR are extraordinarily burdensome on individual litigants).  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Stevens shrewdly noted that a purely administrative remedy was misaligned with 
the interests of complaining parties: 
[I]t makes little sense to impose on an individual, whose only interest is in obtaining 
a benefit for herself . . . the burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices are 
so pervasively discriminatory that a complete cut-off of federal funding is 
appropriate.  The award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted 
her own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with—and in some cases 
even necessary to—the orderly enforcement of the statute.  
Id. 
55.  441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
56.  See id. at 717 (holding that woman who was denied admission to the University of 
Chicago could sue individually under implied Title IX remedy).  Only several years after the 
initial passage of Title IX, the Supreme Court in Cannon faced a relatively limited analytical 
framework and took note of only two factors before expanding the remedy under Title IX: “Only 
two facts alleged in the complaints are relevant to our decision.  First, petitioner was excluded 
from participation in the respondents’ medical education programs because of her sex.  Second, 
these education programs were receiving federal financial assistance at the time of her 
exclusion.”  Id. at 680. 
57.  See id. at 703 (“[W]hen that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the 
accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its implication 
under the statute.”); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) 
(allowing monetary relief in private Title IX suits after acknowledging prospective relief and 
administrative action would leave some plaintiffs without adequate remedy). 
58.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703–04 (noting that both purposes were repeatedly 
identified in debates over enactment of Title IX).  As to the first purpose of keeping federal 
funds away from discriminatory institutions, Hawaii Representative Patsy Mink stated: 
Any college or university which has [a] . . . policy which discriminates against 
women applicants . . . is free to do so under [Title IX] but such institutions should 
not be asking the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination.  
Millions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that 
these funds should be used for the support of institutions to which we are denied 
equal access. 
117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971) (statement of Rep. Mink).  As to the second purpose, of 
protecting individuals from discriminatory practices, Senator Bayh stated: “[Title IX] is a strong 
and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to provide women with solid 
legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers . . . .”  118 CONG. REC. 
5806–5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
59.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704, n.36 (deducing two alleged purposes behind passage 
of Title IX based on arguments offered in support of Act during its drafting and debate in 1971 
and 1972).  In determining the two purposes behind the passage of Title IX, the Court 
specifically quoted statements made by Representative Mink and Senator Bayh in the debates 
surrounding the passage of Title IX.  See supra note 58 (Congressional statements used by the 
Court in Cannon). 
10
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the Cannon decision served the first purpose, there were no appropriate means of 
accomplishing the second purpose at that time.60  An implied right of action, the 
Court reasoned, was necessary to accomplish the purpose of the statute: to 
federally mandate the protection of individuals from discrimination.61  Therefore, 
the Court held that Title IX could be used implicitly as a statutory vehicle for 
individual relief.62 
For many years, the primary parties involved in private Title IX actions were 
students bringing claims against universities.63  The Supreme Court, however, 
expanded the class of individuals able to seek relief under Title IX in North Haven 
Board of Education v. Bell.64  According to the Court, both the legislative and 
postenactment history of Title IX supported the inclusion of employees in the 
class of people entitled to protection under Title IX.65  To give Title IX the wide 
 
60.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704–06 (discussing deficiencies of administrative redress 
to provide adequate justice for students injured by an educational institution’s failure to comply 
with Title IX).  According to the Court, the first purpose of Title IX—to avoid the use of federal 
resources to support sexually-biased institutions—was already served by “the statutory 
procedure for the termination of federal financial support for institutions engaged in 
discriminatory practices.”  See id. at 704.  The Court acknowledged that this remedy is a 
particularly severe sanction for an educational institution, but it does not provide an appropriate 
means of accomplishing the second purpose, which is to protect individuals from noncompliant 
institutions.  See id. at 705. 
61.  See id. at 699–703 (reasoning that striking parallels between Title VI and Title IX 
support the creation of a private right of action under Title IX).  The Court noted that when Title 
IX was enacted, Title VI had already been construed several times as creating a private 
remedy.  See id. at 696.  For Title VI suits, no express cause of action was available under its 
statutory language, but private suits moved forward anyway.  See id. at 700.  When evaluating 
the relationship between Title IX and Title IV the Court noted, “Except for the substitution of 
the word ‘sex’ in Title IX to replace the words ‘race, color, or national origin’ in Title VI, the 
two statutes use identical language to describe the benefitted class.”  Id. at 694–95.  In the 
Court’s view, the similar language used in Title VI and Title IX supported the conclusion that 
Congress intended to create statutes with similar goals of protection, similar modes of 
enforcement, and similar methods of recovery.  See id. at 696–98.  Since an implied right of 
action already existed under Title VI, an anti-discriminatory statute, the Court held that the 
second purpose of Title IX—protecting individuals from discrimination—would also served by 
“the award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted her own suit is not only 
sensible but is also fully consistent with—and in some cases even necessary to—the orderly 
enforcement of that statute.”  See id. at 705–06. 
62.  See id. at 709 (“Not only the words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter 
and underlying purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of private victims of 
discrimination.”). 
63.  See generally N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535–36 (1982) 
(introducing school employees to existing class of persons deserving protection under Title IX).  
The Supreme Court held that a female employee of a school district who complained of gender 
discrimination had a cause of action under Title IX.  See id. at 540. 
64.  456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
65.  See id. at 535–36 (borrowing same method of reasoning used in Cannon, the Court 
reviewed Congressional Record and determined that weight of legislative history as well as 
postenactment developments, are important authority to consider when interpreting scope of 
Title IX).  As an example of how Title IX has been construed broadly in the past, the Court 
recounted U.S. Senator James McClure’s attempt to introduce an amendment to Title IX that 
would have restricted the term “educational program or activity” to include only curriculum or 
graduation requirements of the relevant institution.  See id. at 535.  The Amendment failed after 
opposition from Senator Bayh, who claimed “it would exempt those areas of traditional 
discrimination against women that are the reason for the Congressional enactment of Title IX.”  
11
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scope of protection Congress intended, the Court construed the Act’s written form 
generously.66  In doing so, the Court paid special attention to the language 
Congress selected in Title IX, particularly to the use of the word “person” rather 
than the selection of a more limited word, such as “student.”67  Title IX’s broad 
directive that no “person” should be subject to gender discrimination ultimately 
supported the conclusion that employees also should not suffer any exclusion or 
denial of benefits on the basis of sex.68 
B. Changes in Air Pressure: The Supreme Court Establishes the Davis 
Standard 
The Court issued its last major expansion of recovery under Title IX in Davis 
ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education.69  In its most liberal 
ruling on Title IX yet, the Supreme Court held that a person may pursue a private 
cause of action against a school receiving federal funds in the case of student-on-
student, or peer, sexual harassment.70  That is, an educational institution need not 
be the direct perpetrator of the discrimination or harassment at issue in order to 
be held privately liable for the harm done to one of its students; it is enough if the 
school knew about the hostile circumstances and did nothing to address them.71 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
66.  See id. at 521–22 (noting that Title IX lists exclusion of classes by specific schools, 
such as certain religious and military institutions, and that absence of a specific class exclusion 
for “employees” in this section supported conclusion that Title IX’s broad protection of 
“persons” extends beyond students to include employees). 
67.  See id. at 521 (surmising that Congress’s use of the word “person” in Title IX 
statutory language implies broad application of protection); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018) 
(declaring that no person shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex by publicly 
funded educational institution).  
68.  See id. (opining that broad language and purpose of Title IX implies generous 
interpretation of word “person”).  The Court noted that the Congressional selection of the 
particular word “person” in lieu of other possible class categorizations was significant: 
Because [Title IX] neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its 
reach, we should interpret the provision as covering and protecting these “persons” 
unless other considerations counsel to the contrary.  After all, Congress easily could 
have substituted “student” or “beneficiary” for the word “person” if it had wished to 
restrict the scope of [Title IX]. 
Id. 
69.  526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
70.  See id. at 646–47 (holding that school’s failure to investigate, adjudicate, or report 
known sexual harassment of young girl by a student created an abusive environment that 
deprived her of educational benefits and opportunities protected under Title IX).  The Davis 
decision ultimately announced that a school is not only liable under Title IX for its own 
misconduct, but also for the misconduct of one of its students when it fails to properly pursue 
steps to remedy a known instance of student-on-student harassment.  See id. 
71.  See id. (“We thus conclude that recipients of federal funding may be liable for 
‘subject[ing]’ their students to discrimination where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to 
known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the harasser is under the school’s 
disciplinary authority.” (alteration in original)); see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 
524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (addressing whether school receiving federal funding was liable under 
Title IX for harassment perpetrated teachers against student).  Just a year prior to Davis, the 
Court outlined a deliberate indifference test to determine whether an employee’s independent 
sexual misconduct is attributable to the school district under Title IX.  See id.  In a decision 
written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that two criteria must be met in order to succeed 
12
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The three-prong test from Davis requires a plaintiff to first establish that the 
sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it 
deprived the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits 
provided by the school.72  Second, the plaintiff must prove that the school had 
actual knowledge of the sexual harassment.73  Finally, the plaintiff must show 
that the school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.74  The Court offered 
a comprehensive discussion regarding the definition of deliberate indifference 
and its relation to the level of misconduct required to warrant a claim under Title 
IX.75  According to Davis, not only must the school official have substantial 
authority over the person, but the conduct in question must have occurred in 
circumstances under considerable exposure to the official or the institution.76  The 
Court defined the deliberate indifference standard as: “the recipient’s response to 
the harassment or lack thereof [must be] clearly unreasonable in light of the 
known circumstances.”77  Since the Davis decision, federal courts have 
 
on a private Title IX claim.  See id. at 290.  First, the plaintiff must show that a school official 
with the authority to correct the circumstances knew of the offensive conduct.  See id.  The 
Court went on to clarify that an appropriate official is a person who works at the recipient entity 
with the authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.  See id.  Second, the party 
must show that despite having such knowledge, the school failed to properly respond; or acted 
with deliberate indifference.  See id. at 291.  The Court further noted that the deliberate 
indifference standard is one that requires actual notice.  See id.  In sum, the Court defined the 
deliberate indifference test and stated: “We conclude that damages may not be recovered . . . 
unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective 
measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the 
teacher’s misconduct.”  Id. at 277. 
72.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (explaining requisite extent of the suffered harassment 
needed in order to pursue a Title IX claim against an educational institution); see also Thacker, 
supra note 11, at 711 (outlining prongs of test from Davis).  
73.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (establishing actual notice as standard of knowledge for 
school administrators). 
74.  See id. at 643 (reintroducing deliberate indifference standard first outlined by 
Supreme Court as an appropriate standard for reviewing Title IX claims).  For a further 
discussion on the deliberate indifference standard, see infra notes 75–84 and accompanying 
text.  
75.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (justifying the high standard of requiring claimant to 
prove that harassment was so serious as to have systemic effect of denying access to educational 
program).  The Court noted that because a school cannot realistically, or fairly, be held liable 
for every independent act by each of its students, the standard for Title IX claims is considerably 
high:  
By limiting private damages actions to cases having a systemic effect on educational 
programs or activities, we reconcile the general principle that Title IX prohibits 
official indifference to known peer sexual harassment with the practical realities of 
responding to student behavior, realities that Congress could not have meant to be 
ignored. 
Id. 
76.  See id. at 645 (limiting recipient school’s liability to circumstances where institution 
exercises substantial control over both harasser and context in which known harassment occurs).  
77.  See id. at 648 (describing deliberate indifference standard); see also Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (explaining deliberate indifference and its 
implications on enforcement of Title IX); Thacker, supra note 11, at 712–13 (“The phrase ‘not 
clearly unreasonable’ is the prong where circuit courts, as well as district courts, have split.  
Exactly what type of conduct ensures that a school district’s response to student-on-student 
harassment is ‘not clearly unreasonable’ is still up for debate.”).  The Court explicitly defined 
deliberate indifference in Gebser as “an official decision by the recipient of public funding not 
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consistently and universally applied the deliberate indifference standard.78 
Before Davis, the Court had not considered claims involving peer-
harassment, and it depended heavily on external sources to justify its grant of 
private claims for peer offenses.79  Just as in Cannon and Bell, the Court primarily 
relied on past judicial interpretations of Title VII, as well as material dispersed 
by the OCR regarding appropriate responses to peer-harassment.80  In doing so, 
the Court broadened the scope of Title IX, and the Davis decision became known 
as a victory for advocates of Title IX’s expansion.81  Still, though the decision 
gave plaintiffs the power to hold educational institutions liable for failing to act 
 
to remedy the [Title IX] violation” once that recipient has notice of the violation.  See Gebser, 
524 U.S. at 290.  
78.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 645 (“That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, 
‘cause [students] to undergo’ harassment or ‘make them liable or vulnerable’ to it.” (alteration 
in original)); see, e.g., Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 706-07 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(stating Davis is the standard by which peer harassment claims are evaluated); K.T. v. Culver-
Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiff had failed to meet 
standard for peer harassment claim under Davis); Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 614 (noting 
Davis must be met in order to impose liability on school for peer harassment claim) (7th Cir. 
2014); Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2007) (outlining elements of 
Davis test); Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist., 418 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding language 
from Davis regarding “actual notice” was sufficient for jury instruction on Title IX claim); 
Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This is our first 
application of Davis to a student-student harassment case.”). 
79.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 638–49 (discussing precedential decisions issued by Supreme 
Court on Title IX, examining language of statute, and analyzing records of debates between 
members of Congress over the proper interpretation of Title IX claims).  In particular, the Davis 
decision relied heavily on the holding in Gebser just a year prior.  See id. at 643.  The Court 
specifically stated: “Gebser thus established that a recipient intentionally violates Title IX, and 
is subject to a private damages action, where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known 
acts of teacher-student discrimination.”  Id.  Applying this very same framework from Gebser, 
the Supreme Court successfully created a test in Davis to determine whether the independent 
conduct of a student is attributable to the school district.  See id.  In doing so, the Court expanded 
the protective reach of Title IX by preventing recipients of federal funding from not only 
engaging in discriminatory behavior, but also failing to stop discriminatory behavior.  See id. 
80.  See id. at 636 (borrowing concepts and reasoning from Title VII jurisprudence).  The 
Court noted some similarities between Title VII and Title IX: 
[A]s Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile working 
environment created by co-workers and tolerated by the 
employer, Title IX encompasses a claim for damages due to 
a sexually hostile educational environment created by a 
fellow student or students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to 
eliminate the harassment. 
Id. (quoting Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (1996)).  
The Court in Davis also cited a contemporary OCR handbook, which, in its official guidance, 
advised educators to take immediate steps to investigate the claims and take steps to eliminate 
a hostile environment.  See id. at 648. 
81.  Compare Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 477 (D.N.H. 1997) 
(“Accordingly, since the duty of a school to its students should correlate with that of an 
employer to its employees, it makes sense to apply the knew-or-should-have-known standard 
to the instant action.”), with Brodeur v. Claremont Sch. Dist., 626 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 (D.N.H. 
2009) (outlining elements of Davis, including deliberate indifference standard and actual 
knowledge requirement, as appropriate test for evaluating Title IX claim); see Thacker, supra 
note 11, at 711 (explaining that Davis is dominating precedent for Title IX peer harassment 
claims). 
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss6/1
2019] NOTE 15 
on peer-harassment claims, the Davis test is a high burden to overcome.82  To 
establish a viable Title IX claim, Davis requires the plaintiff to address three 
elements that are incredibly difficult to prove: deliberate indifference, actual 
knowledge, and severe, pervasive and objectively offensive harassment.83  
Despite these setbacks, Davis stands today as the touchstone decision for 
evaluating peer-harassment claims pursuant to Title IX.84 
C. Eye of the Storm: K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College’s Silence on 
Nonstudent Standing 
Only one month before the District Court of Rhode Island issued its decision 
in Doe, the Eighth Circuit delivered an opinion in a case with almost identical 
facts: K.T. v. Culver-Stockton College.85  In K.T., Culver-Stockton College 
invited a female nonstudent to visit the campus as a potential recruit for the 
school’s women’s soccer team.86  While on campus, an enrolled student sexually 
assaulted the nonstudent at a fraternity house party.87  According to the 
nonstudent, she reported the assault to campus authorities the same weekend it 
occurred, but the college failed to pursue any further action in response to the 
 
82.  See Heather D. Redmond, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: Scant 
Protection for the Student Body, 18 LAW & INEQ. 393, 412 (2000) (“Although the ultimate 
conclusion of the Court in Davis was correct, the standard is too narrow.”).  Redmond argued 
that the actual notice standard established in Davis is ineffective in a school setting because it 
requires young, inexperienced, and ill-equipped students to make reports of peer harassment to 
school officials, and effectively gives school officials permission to ignore student conduct until 
that actual notice is received.  See id. at 415.  Instead, Redmond argued the Court should have 
adopted a constructive notice standard, which is what several circuits utilized in Title IX cases 
prior to the Davis decision, and is similar to the standard used in Title VII cases of sexual 
harassment in the workplace.  See id. at 413.  Redmond also took issue with the deliberate 
indifference standard established by Davis because it requires a school to show only that it was 
not “clearly unreasonable” in its response to a Title IX claim.  See id. at 415; see also Walker, 
supra note 2, at 110 (pointing out that though Supreme Court had sided with survivor of sexual 
harassment in creating peer-harassment doctrine, it also established impossibly high bar for 
recovery). 
83.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (establishing elements for evaluating peer harassment 
Title IX claim); see also Thacker, supra note 11, at 711 (outlining prongs of test from Davis); 
Walker, supra note 2, at 110–11 (discussing how elements of Davis have repeatedly frustrated 
courts and plaintiffs); see, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 164, 174 (1st 
Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (“[T]itle IX does not require 
educational institutions to take heroic measures, to perform flawless investigations, to craft 
perfect solutions, or to adopt strategies advocated by parents. The test is . . . whether the 
institution’s response . . . is so deficient as to be clearly unreasonable.”); Bostic, 418 F.3d at 361 
(holding notice of mere possibility of sexual harassment to proper official is not sufficient to 
satisfy actual notice standard); P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 663 (8th Cir. 
2001) (holding instance where principal was notified by teachers about possible inappropriate 
behavior toward student was insufficient to constitute actual notice). 
84.  See Thacker, supra note 11, at 711 (noting that Davis is the most significant 
precedent in peer-harassment and sexual assault claims). 
85.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
nonstudent who was sexually assaulted on college campus did not meet requisite elements 
needed to succeed in a private right of action under Title IX). 
86.  See id. (noting means by which nonstudent arrived on college campus, where the 
sexual misconduct took place). 
87.  See id. (detailing factual circumstances surrounding sexual misconduct). 
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claim.88  The nonstudent then sued the college in federal court under Title IX.89 
Culver-Stockton College replied to the complaint with a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that the nonstudent-plaintiff failed to state a claim because she was not 
an enrolled student at the time of the assault.90  The college contended that the 
peer-harassment doctrine, as the name suggests, applies only in cases where 
students sue their school over harassment by a fellow student.91  The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri agreed, reasoning that 
the implications of the nonstudent-plaintiff’s argument were inconsistent with the 
appropriate standards for Title IX claims outlined in Davis.92  The decision noted 
that the Supreme Court requires a degree of misconduct so extreme that it has a 
systemic effect on educational programs or activities of the claimant—who 
presumably has access to the programs and activities offered by the offending 
school.93  The Eastern District of Missouri postulated that if any person invited 
to a campus had standing to sue for peer-harassment under Title IX, it would 
expand the scope of Title IX’s protection beyond the limit the Court outlined in 
Davis.94  Therefore, the court chose to preclude nonstudents rather than, in its 
view, expose hundreds of colleges and universities to an unprecedented degree 
of liability.95 
 
88.  See id. (explaining that though incident was reported immediately, defendant college 
did nothing other than cancel scheduled conference with K.T. and her parents). 
89.  See id. (noting K.T.’s claim was based on a peer-harassment theory first promulgated 
in the Davis decision).  The nonstudent-plaintiff brought a private Title IX action according to 
the standard laid out in Davis: “Davis held that a federally funded institution may be liable for 
damages in a private Title IX action if its deliberate indifference to known acts of peer 
harassment denied the victim access to educational opportunities provided by the institution.”  
Id.  Specifically, the nonstudent-plaintiff claimed the college acted with deliberate indifference 
by first failing to take reasonable preventative measures such as supervising her during her visit, 
and second, by failing to investigate the claim and provide her with adequate treatment after she 
reported the incident.  See id. 
90.  See id. at 1056 (explaining procedural posture of case and parties’ respective 
arguments). 
91.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 4243965 at *5 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016) (holding at district court level that nonstudent was outside scope of 
persons Congress intended Title IX to protect).  In response to the plaintiff’s assertions, Culver-
Stockton College responded that both the underlying purpose and overarching extent of Title 
IX did not support the extension of protection to a nonstudent: 
The College replies that the foundational underpinning of the Supreme Court’s 
limited extension of liability for student-on-student harassment in Davis is the 
remedial purpose embodied in Title IX of preventing on-going harassment of 
students based on their gender.  It argues there is a material difference between a 
student who is enrolled, taking classes, and remains on campus with an alleged 
harasser, and plaintiff, who alleges she only visited the campus for a day or two. 
Id. 
92.  Id. at *6 (noting that Davis emphasized the requirement of a substantial effect on 
access to educational opportunities and benefits of Title IX claimant, and recognizing that the 
plaintiff’s basis for liability was based on a single event). 
93.  See id. (discussing the required elements under test from Davis); see also supra notes 
69–84 and accompanying text for extensive analysis of Title IX standards promulgated by 
Davis. 
94.  See K.T., 2016 WL 4243965 at *6 (“[A] non-student, subjected to a single instance 
of harassment by a student, no matter how severe, cannot bring an action against the institution 
because there is no systemic effect on [the non-student’s] educational programs or activities.”). 
95.  See id. (justifying preclusion of nonstudents under Title IX in lieu of opening 
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit declined to address whether, as a threshold 
requirement, a plaintiff must be a student in order to claim recovery under Title 
IX.96  Instead, the court assumed arguendo that the plaintiff’s status as a 
nonstudent did not preclude her from asserting a Title IX harassment claim, and 
heard the complaint on its merits.97  The Eighth Circuit found that, because 
Culver-Stockton College had no prior basis for anticipating the sexual assault, the 
nonstudent-plaintiff failed to satisfy the deliberate indifference element of a Title 
IX claim.98  The court also noted that although the  nonstudent-plaintiff informed 
the school of the assault immediately after it occurred, the actual knowledge 
element requires the funding recipient to have prior notice of a substantial risk of 
peer-harassment.99  Finally, the court remarked that a single grievance, no matter 
how individually heinous, does not adequately assert the kind of severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive discrimination required under the Davis 
standard for peer-harassment claims.100  Though the Eighth Circuit ultimately 
 
floodgates).  The Eastern District had no interest in shouldering a massive expansion of 
collegiate liability, especially when no previous case law was on-point with the issue, and the 
Supreme Court had been clear in its instructions in Davis: “Accepting [Plaintiff K.T.’s] 
argument would impermissibly expand the law’s scope beyond the limited right of action 
recognized by the Supreme Court [in Davis] that requires a ‘systemic effect on educational 
programs or activities.’”  See id. (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652–53 (1999)). 
96.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(acknowledging that both parties disputed whether the plaintiff’s nonstudent status precluded 
her from asserting a Title IX claim).  Though the Eighth Circuit identified the central issue as 
whether the nonstudent had standing to bring suit, it assumed arguendo that enrollment status 
was not a determinative factor to seek a private remedy under Title IX.  See id.  In choosing to 
evaluate K.T.’s claim on its merits, the Eighth Circuit declined to affirmatively decide if 
nonstudents could seek Title IX recovery via the Davis test, and left open the question of 
standing for nonstudent-plaintiffs.  See id.  The implications of this judicial decision are 
discussed further in notes infra 160–79 and accompanying text. 
97.  See K.T., 865 F.3d at 1057 (evaluating plaintiff’s private Title IX claim based on 
elements outlined in Davis).  The Eighth Circuit considered whether Culver-Stockton College 
acted with deliberate indifference, whether Culver-Stockton College had actual knowledge of 
the discrimination, and whether the nonstudent-plaintiff experienced severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive discrimination.  See id. 
98.  See id. at 1058 (“At most, [K.T.’s] allegations link the College’s inaction with 
emotional trauma K.T. claims she experienced following the assault.  The complaint does not, 
however, allege that Culver-Stockton’s purported indifference ‘subject[ed] [K.T.] to the 
harassment.’”) (quoting Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999) 
(alteration in the original)).  In other words, the alleged deliberate indifference on the part of 
the institution must cause the assault, and it is not sufficient if the deliberate indifference is a 
mere reflection of the school’s after-the-fact response to the plaintiff’s complaint of the assault.  
See id.  
99.  See id. at 1058–59 (explaining requisite standard to satisfy actual knowledge element 
of private Title IX claim).  The court noted that the plaintiff needed to provide more than a 
single post-incident notice of her sexual assault in order to satisfy the actual knowledge element.  
See id.  In the Eighth Circuit, “actual knowledge may be established where the recipient has 
prior knowledge of (1) harassment previously committed by the same perpetrator and/or (2) 
previous reports of sexual harassment repeatedly occurring on the same premises.”  Id. (citing 
Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)).  Because the 
plaintiff’s complaint lacked any assertion that the college knew she faced a risk of sexual assault 
or harassment on their campus during her visit, she did not fulfill the actual knowledge element.  
See id. 
100.  See id. at 1059 (“Although we are sympathetic to K.T.’s circumstances and agree 
17
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halted the nonstudent-plaintiff’s suit for the stated reasons, its refusal to 
categorically preclude nonstudents from bringing suit axiomatically implied that 
if nonstudent-plaintiffs satisfy the elements of a peer-harassment claim they may 
bring a private claim under Title IX.101 
III. WEATHER REPORT: THE FACTS OF DOE v. BROWN UNIVERSITY 
In September 2017, the District Court of Rhode Island faced the very same 
question the Eighth Circuit declined to address only a few weeks prior in K.T.: 
whether nonstudents have standing to bring a private right of action under Title 
IX against educational institutions.102  Jane Doe was a freshman student at 
Providence College in Providence, Rhode Island.103  In November 2013, three 
Brown University football players drugged Jane Doe at a bar in Providence before 
taking her back to Brown University’s campus where they sexually assaulted 
her.104  Several days after the incident, Jane Doe received medical treatment and 
underwent laboratory tests at a Massachusetts hospital.105  She reported the 
assault to both Providence Police and Brown University Police in February 
2014.106 
In the fall of 2014, after Jane Doe made several requests to the 
administration, Brown University finally agreed to conduct an inquiry into her 
 
that she has alleged opprobrious misconduct on the part of the fraternity member, K.T.’s 
singular grievance on its own does not plausibly allege pervasive discrimination as required to 
state a peer harassment claim.”).  Notably, in its discussion of this element, the court did not 
place significant emphasis on the fact that the discrimination must affect access to an 
educational program or activity.  See id.  Rather, it highlighted the need for a plaintiff to prove 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive discrimination.  See id.  Additionally, the court 
remarked that under the Davis standard, a singular grievance of harassment, on its own, is not 
enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an education program 
or activity, thereby implying that further evidence of the adverse effects suffered by a survivor 
are necessary for a successful Title IX claim.  See id.; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (noting 
relationship between victim and harasser necessarily affects the extent to which the misconduct 
can be said to breach Title IX standards).  In other words, though student-on-student harassment 
is actionable under Title IX, the Court in Davis stated that it is less likely to disrupt a student’s 
educational benefits and systemically affect educational programs or activities than would 
teacher-on-student misconduct as in Gebser.  See id.  
101.  For a further discussion on the implications of the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in 
K.T., see infra notes 160–79 and accompanying text. 
102.  See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 561 (D.R.I. 2017) (“[C]an a 
Providence College student who was sexually assaulted by a Brown student on Brown’s campus 
bring a Title IX damages suit against Brown alleging deprivation of an educational opportunity 
at Providence College?”), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018). 
103.  See id. at 558 (stating Jane Doe’s enrollment at Providence College at time of 
incident). 
104.  See id. (describing how Jane Doe was taken from bar by taxi back to Brown 
University’s campus). 
105.  See id. (explaining lab tests later confirmed Jane Doe had common-date rape drug 
in her system at time of incident). 
106.  See id. (recounting public safety and law enforcement agencies to which Jane Doe 
reported incident of sexual assault).  Providence Police executed search warrants for cell phones 
and dorm rooms of suspects and found phone communications between football players 
referencing rape, as well as explicit photographs of Jane Doe, which were taken during assault.  
See id. 
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allegations under the school’s disciplinary code, but not under federal Title IX 
standards.107  Following Jane Doe’s repeated questioning regarding the results of 
the investigation, Brown University eventually informed her in 2016 that it never 
completed the internal inquiry concerning her assault and had abandoned any 
disciplinary action against the students.108  Jane Doe ultimately withdrew from 
Providence College, claiming that Brown’s failure to pursue disciplinary action 
against its students allowed the students the freedom to roam the city of 
Providence, including Providence College, and caused her to fear for her 
safety.109 
Jane Doe then sued Brown University and several of its administrators 
alleging they failed to adequately protect her under Title IX and acted with 
deliberate indifference by refusing to investigate or provide any other remedy for 
her assault.110  She further claimed that because Brown University failed to 
respond effectively to her complaint, the undisciplined attackers were allowed 
free range of the local area, which in turn generated a hostile educational 
environment at Providence College.111  Jane Doe alleged that this fear caused a 
substantial interference with her educational opportunities and benefits, 
ultimately causing her to withdraw.112 
Jane Doe brought her Title IX claim in the United States District Court for 
the District of Rhode Island.113  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), 
Brown University moved for judgment on the pleadings and argued that because 
Jane Doe was not an enrolled student and did not receive any educational benefit 
from Brown University, she was not entitled to the University’s protection under 
Title IX.114  According to Brown University, the class of persons afforded Title 
 
107.  See id. at 558 (noting Brown University would not initially investigate Jane Doe’s 
complaint until pressed, and did not investigate complaint pursuant to federal standards).  Jane 
Doe ultimately filed a complaint against Brown University with OCR because she believed 
Brown University was required to address her complaint under Title IX, though the complaint 
was pending at time of District Court’s ruling). Id. at 558, n.2. 
108.  See id. at 558 (describing Brown University’s failure to comply with Jane Doe’s 
request that it completed its inquiry into the alleged incident). 
109.  See id. (explaining Jane Doe’s purported reasons for withdrawing from Providence 
College). 
110.  See id. at 558–59 (naming Brown University; Jonah Allen Ward, Senior Associate 
Dean of Student Life; and Yolanda Castillo-Appollonio, Associate Dean of Student Life, as co-
defendants in the suit). 
111.  See id. at 559 (explaining how Brown University’s alleged failure to comply with 
Title IX adversely affected Jane Doe).  Jane Doe, though not a student at Brown University, 
attended Providence College, another institution of higher education located nearby.  See id.  As 
a result of Brown University’s failure to respond to her complaint, Jane Doe alleged that she 
suffered fear for her safety on her own school’s campus and in the general Providence area.  See 
id.  Because the men from Brown University who assaulted her faced no disciplinary action by 
their own institution, they were not prohibited from being near or contacting her.  See id.  As a 
result of this fear, she allegedly suffered a “hostile education environment” at Providence 
College, which substantially interfered with her access to educational opportunities or benefits.  
See id. 
112.  See id. (describing reasoning behind Jane Doe’s allegations and subsequent 
withdrawal from Providence College). 
113.  See id. (noting Jane Doe also claimed violations of Rhode Island Civil Rights Act 
(RICRA) and Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution). 
114.  See id. at 559 (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings [under Rule 12(c)] is treated 
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IX protection is limited to the students and staff of the offending school.115  Jane 
Doe sought to expand this class and petitioned the District Court of Rhode Island 
to widen the scope of the statute’s protection to include nonstudents.116  
According to Jane Doe, the statutory language of Title IX reflects Congress’s 
intent to protect all persons, regardless of their enrollment status, who come 
within the school’s control.117  The court ultimately agreed with Brown 
University; Jane Doe was not a student of the school and therefore did not fall 
within Title IX’s private-cause-of-action umbrella of protection.118 
IV. A CLOUD WITHOUT A SILVER LINING: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF DOE v. 
BROWN UNIVERSITY 
In support of its decision to preclude Jane Doe from the class of persons 
entitled to individual recovery under Title IX, the District Court of Rhode Island 
began its analysis by outlining the requisite elements of a Title IX claim set forth 
in Davis.119  According to the court, the requisite elements assume at the outset 
that the plaintiff is part of a class entitled to Title IX protection.120  At the time of 
the decision, the court noted that the relevant federal case law had only designated 
 
much like a Rule (12)(b)(6) motion to dismiss. . . .  The court must first set aside conclusory 
allegations and second, it must consider whether the residual facts support a ‘reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)).  Brown University asserted that Title IX protections are limited to student-
on-student harassment when both students were enrolled at same school where harassment 
occurred.  See id. at 560. 
115.  See id. (explaining the University’s argument that Jane Doe did not receive any 
educational benefit from Brown University that would entitle her to recovery). 
116.  See id. at 560–61 (utilizing the specific selection statutory language in Title IX, as 
well as past precedent to expand the reach of Title IX, to bolster her argument). 
117.  See id. at 560 (explaining that Jane Doe’s argument for nonstudent protection under 
Title IX hinges on Congress’s use of general word “person” rather than more specific word 
“student” in written statutory text); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“No person in the United 
States, shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance . . . .”). 
118.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (refusing to extend Title IX protections to 
nonstudents).  
119.  See id. at 560 (listing requisite elements for private claim under Title IX in the First 
Circuit, based on requisite elements as outlined in Davis).  In the First Circuit, a private litigant 
seeking a remedy under Title IX must demonstrate:  
(1) that he or she was subject to ‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ sexual 
harassment by a school peer, and (2) that the harassment caused the plaintiff to be 
deprived of educational opportunities or benefits . . . (3) [the funding recipient] knew 
of the harassment, (4) in its programs or activities and (5) it was deliberately 
indifferent to the harassment such that its response (or lack thereof) is clearly 
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. 
Id. (quoting Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
120.  See id. at 560 (explaining that, as a threshold matter, Jane Doe must prove her 
standing as member of class entitled to Title IX protection).  It is important to note here that 
several other Title IX cases in the First Circuit have required plaintiffs to establish their status 
as students either at the outset of the claim or as an element to the claim.  See, e.g., Porto, 488 
F.3d at 72–73 (listing plaintiff’s status as a student as a requisite element to recover under Title 
IX); Frazier v. Fairhaven, 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002) (requiring that plaintiff be a student 
before pursuing a harassment claim). 
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two categories of protected individuals: students and employees.121  Because the 
specific question of whether nonstudents have standing to bring a private Title IX 
claim was one of first impression, the court turned to the legislative intent, 
statutory language, and ultimately its own interpretation of Title IX case law for 
guidance.122 
After reviewing both the statutory language and legislative history, the court 
concluded that Congress intended private enforcement of Title IX against a 
school to be a program-specific action.123  The court reasoned that before Cannon 
made a private right under Title IX available, the statute’s primary enforcement 
mechanism applied financial penalties to the program in violation of federal 
standards, and not to the school in general.124  To further support its conclusion, 
the court also looked to statements made by United States Senator Birch Bayh, 
 
121.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 560 (listing various cases from the First Circuit and 
Supreme Court involving only students and employees as plaintiffs).  See generally Davis ex 
rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (involving student-plaintiff 
suing school for Title IX violation); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) 
(allowing employees to bring private right of action action against school under Title IX); 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (involving plaintiff who was student-applicant 
denied admission to university); Frazier, 276 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiff must be 
student in order to initiate Title IX suit). 
122.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (“[T]he Court turns back to the purpose of the 
statute and its language—who did Congress intend to protect from discrimination in educational 
programs based on gender; and who did it intend to punish; and to whom did the United States 
Supreme Court intend to give a private right of action?”). 
123.  See id. (reasoning that available federal case law and legislative history supported 
conclusion that Title IX is a “program-specific” remedy).  The court borrowed the phrase 
“program-specific” from Bell’s discussion of administrative sanctions for schools in violation 
of Title IX.  Compare id. (“The language of the statute, supported by legislative history, shows 
that enforcing Title IX against a school was meant to be program-specific—that is, the financial 
penalties were applied to the specific program where the violation occurred and not to the school 
in general.”), with Bell, 456 U.S. at 536–37 (“It is not only Title IX’s funding termination 
provision that is program-specific. . . Title IX’s legislative history corroborates its general 
program-specificity.”).  Under Title IX’s enforcement provision, the termination of federal 
funds or denial of future grants is limited, so as to affect only the particular program found in 
violation of Title IX.  See Bell, 456 U.S. at 537 (finding the portion of Title IX authorizing the 
issuance of financial penalties “program-specific”). 
124.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (explaining that history of Title IX’s enforcement 
and federal financial mechanism justify the preclusion of nonstudent private claims).  The court 
in Doe failed to expand upon what, exactly, it means when it claims that the enforcement of 
Title IX was meant to be program specific.  See id.  The court pointed out that the original 
function of the statute was to withhold federal funding from certain programs within an 
educational institution if it violated Title IX.  See id.  But, as Justice Stevens discussed in 
Cannon, Title IX was expanded to serve two underlying purposes: withholding of federal 
financial endorsement from schools that engage in discriminatory practices; and providing 
protection for individuals who were victims of such practices.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.  
For further discussion on Cannon, see supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.  While 
administrative sanctions and civil suits under Title IX are not completely unrelated remedies, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that they are two distinct modes of enforcement under Title 
IX that serve two separate purposes.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561.  In this case, the court 
declined to extend a private remedy to nonstudents in part because the administrative remedy 
has historically targeted specific programs in which students were enrolled.  See id.  Apparently, 
the District Court of Rhode Island cross-contaminated those purposes; it used the program-
specific nature of Title IX administrative sanctions to undermine the implied availability of a 
private remedy.  See id. 
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Jr., of Indiana, the primary author of Title IX, identifying the three kinds of 
discrimination that the Act intended to target: (1) discrimination in admission to 
an institution, (2) discrimination of available services or studies within an 
institution post-admission, and (3) discrimination in employment within an 
institution.125  Senator Bayh’s explanation of the Act’s purpose, as interpreted by 
the court, indicated that Title IX protections have historically been limited to 
admitted students and employees.126 
Relying on Title IX’s statutory language, the court further refuted Doe’s 
attempt to expand the class of persons entitled to protections under Title IX.127  
The court conceded that in Bell, the Supreme Court placed significant emphasis 
on the use of the word “person” instead of “student” in the phrasing of the Act.128  
While the Court liberally construed the word “person” to include both students 
and employees in Bell, the court in Doe distinguished Bell’s expansive 
construction for two reasons.129  First, the court recognized that the controversy 
in Bell was not over a private right of action under Title IX, but whether Title IX 
prohibits education programs from engaging in discriminatory employment 
practices.130  Second, in addition to noting the different central legal claims in 
 
125.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (using Senator Bayh’s statements to support 
proposition that Title IX intended to protect only admitted students) (citing Bell, 456 U.S. at 
526 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972)).  Senator Bayh outlined three different kinds of 
discrimination he believed Title IX would address:  
We are dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimination of 
available services or studies within an institution once students are admitted and 
discrimination in employment within an institution, as a member of a faculty, or 
whatever.   
Id. (citing Bell, 456 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
126.  See id. (noting Senator Bayh’s explanation of Title IX states that Title IX intended 
to only protect students admitted to offending institutions, save his mention of discrimination 
against employees of those institutions). 
127.  See id. at 562–63 (refusing to adopt Jane Doe’s stance that word “person” used in 
Title IX can be expanded to include non-student plaintiffs); see also supra notes 63–68 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of the word “person” by the Supreme Court in Bell. 
128.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (“The [Supreme] Court concluded that because 
Title IX proscribes employment discrimination in schools, employees of those schools are 
covered in ‘persons.’”); see also Bell, 456 U.S. at 520–21 (noting that “person” implies broad 
directive, appears to include both students and employees).  Additionally, the Court in Bell left 
the door open to expand the scope of “person” even further, by stating that, “Under that 
provision, employees, like other ‘persons,’ may not be ‘excluded from participation in,’ ‘denied 
the benefits of,’ or ‘subjected to discrimination under’ education programs receiving federal 
financial support.”  Bell, 456 U.S. at 520.  This quote, in particular, implies that the Court 
considered the possibility of other persons beyond students and employees deserving protection 
under Title IX, and that being admitted to or enrolled in a program is not a requisite 
characteristic to belong to class of recovery.  See id.  
129.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562–63 (noting there was no question as to employees’ 
connection to educational institution in Bell, nor did Bell address validity of private right of 
action by employees against educational institution under Title IX).  
130.  See id. (reasoning controversy at heart of Bell is incomparable to Doe controversy 
over nonstudent standing in private suits under Title IX).  The District Court of Rhode Island’s 
primary basis for rejecting the Bell court’s reasoning in expanding the scope of the word 
“person” was the incomparable natures of the cases.  See id.  Bell involved the validity of 
Department of Education regulations that prohibited federally funded education programs from 
discriminating on the basis of gender with respect to employment.  See id.; Bell, 456 U.S. at 
514 (describing issue of case, which centered on legality of regulations issued pursuant to Title 
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each case, the court pointed out that the complaining employees in Bell actually 
worked for the offending school and therefore had a direct relationship with the 
institution, unlike the nonstudent-plaintiff in Doe.131 
The court also looked to other federal case law that, while not directly on 
point, adumbrated the proposition that Title IX is limited exclusively to students 
attending the offending school.132  The most important of these case discussions 
was the court’s interpretation of K.T.133  Notably, the District Court of Rhode 
Island adopted the reasoning in the opinion issued by the Eastern District of 
Missouri instead of the more recent holding published by the Eighth Circuit.134  
Drawing parallels from the Eastern District’s classification of the plaintiff in K.T. 
as a nonstudent, the District Court of Rhode Island focused on the fact that Doe 
was not a student at Brown University.135  Therefore, the court reasoned, its 
actions or omissions could not have prevented Doe from getting an education at 
Providence College, where she was enrolled.136  Ultimately, the court found the 
Eastern District of Missouri’s reasoning persuasive, and held that nonstudents 
cannot suffer deprivations from programs or activities at a school they do not 
attend.137  Therefore, according to the District of Rhode Island, nonstudents do 
not have standing to bring private Title IX claims against those schools.138 
 
IX’s protection from discriminatory practices by educational institutions).  In Doe, the issue 
was not the validity of regulatory guidance as grounds for withholding funds, rather, it was 
whether the class of persons entitled to recovery under Title IX should be expanded to 
nonstudents.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563.  
131.  See id. (noting that employees in Bell had stronger relationship with offending 
institution than Jane Doe had with Brown University). 
132.  See id. at 561 (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis and the First Circuit’s 
decision in Frazier as examples of student-centric Title IX litigation).  In addition to noting that 
Frazier required a plaintiff to allege status as a student, the Doe court quoted the Supreme Court 
in Davis, and emphasized that the plaintiff’s status in Davis as a student implicated the 
availability of a private Title IX claim to admitted students only: “If a funding recipient does 
not engage in harassment directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate 
indifference subjects its students to harassment.”  See id. (quoting Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. 
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
133.  For further discussion on the reasoning employed by the Eastern District Court of 
Missouri and the Eighth Circuit in K.T., see supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text.  
134.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562, n.7 (noting “The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal 
recently upheld K.T. on the merits—however, that Court did not address whether Title IX 
applied to a non-student at the school, but assumed it did in agreeing with the district court’s 
analysis of the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim on the merits.”).  For further clarification on 
the Eighth Circuit’s arguendo approach to the question of nonstudent standing for Title IX 
claims, see supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text. 
135.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (adhering to Eastern District of Missouri’s logic in 
determining that lack of relationship between Brown University and Doe was a dispositive 
factor).  Of particular importance in Doe was the Eastern District of Missouri’s finding that 
“because a non-student does not suffer from a systemic effect on educational programs or 
activities at a school she does not attend, she has no right of action against that school under 
Title IX.”  See id. (citing K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 
4243965 at *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016)). 
136.  See id. (finding that Brown University did not have control or influence over 
educational programs in which Jane Doe was enrolled). 
137.  See id. at 564 (“[L]egal precedent allowing for a private right of action for damages 
is limited to certain situations.  The Court finds that Ms. Doe’s case is not 
among those scenarios.”).  
138.  See id. at 563 (“[Jane Doe’s] federal claim under Title IX fails to state a claim for 
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V. WHEN IT RAINS, IT POURS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DOE v. BROWN 
UNIVERSITY 
Despite the District Court of Rhode Island’s insistence that its holding in 
Doe honored the statutory language and legislative intent of Title IX, there are 
other possible interpretations of federal case law and legislative history that lead 
to a different conclusion.139  The court’s decision has serious practical 
repercussions by allowing schools to negligently investigate and adjudicate 
sexual misconduct claims involving nonstudents—without being held judicially 
accountable.140  Courts should abandon Doe’s blanket preclusion of nonstudent-
plaintiffs in Title IX actions and allow them to bring claims against educational 
institutions.141  The implications of the Doe decision are not only inconsistent 
with the overall intent of Title IX, but potentially jeopardizes the health and safety 
of students and college communities.142 
A. Updated Forecast: Revisiting Title IX’s History 
When a private right of action under Title IX was first introduced in Cannon, 
the Supreme Court stated that the creation of a private remedy served one of two 
legislative purposes underlying the passage of Title IX: to provide individuals 
effective protection against discriminatory practices.143  With this purpose in 
mind, Doe’s denial of a private remedy to nonstudents is in direct contradiction 
to the very justification used in Cannon to create a mechanism for relief under 
 
which relief can be granted and therefore it is dismissed.”).  The court noted that because Jane 
Doe was never a student at Brown University, it was not possible for her to lose any benefits or 
opportunities she never had access to in the first place.  See id. at 562. 
139.  For further discussion of how, contrary to the District Court of Rhode Island’s 
assertion, federal case law and congressional material can be interpreted to support Title IX 
protections for nonstudent-plaintiffs, see infra notes 140–79 and accompanying text. 
140.  For further discussion of the implications of the Doe decision, see infra notes 143–
79 and accompanying text.  
141.  For further discussion of the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in K.T., see supra notes 85–
101 and accompanying text. 
142.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 564 (“This is a difficult conclusion to reach in the face 
of Ms. Doe’s arguments that Brown and other schools may act or continue to act with deliberate 
indifference to sexual harassment and violence on its campus.”).  In its concluding statements, 
the District Court of Rhode Island acknowledged its holding in Doe may tacitly permit schools 
to ignore Title IX complaints by nonstudents and allow those schools to escape accountability 
when they do.  See id.  It is no great leap to assume that a rule which excuses less-than 
deliberately indifferent administrative responses to Title IX complaints has health and safety 
implications for students and nonstudents, alike.  See id. 
143.  See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 704 (1979) (claiming second reason 
underlying passage of Title IX was to “provide individual citizens effective protection against 
[discriminatory] practices.”).  The Court noted that the introduction of a private right of action 
under Title IX was necessary to accomplish its underlying statutory purpose.  See id. at 703.  
Furthermore, the Court stated that at the time Cannon was decided, the inclusion of a private 
remedy under Title IX was also supported by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.  
See id. at 706.  The agency took “the unequivocal position that the individual remedy will 
provide effective assistance to achieving the statutory purposes.”  Id. at 706–07.  For further 
discussion of Cannon and the underlying purposes of Title IX, see supra notes 55–62 and 
accompanying text. 
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Title IX.144  The District Court of Rhode Island, however, did not rely on the 
legislative intent the Supreme Court articulated in Cannon, but instead engaged 
in its own inquiry regarding Title IX’s legislative history, relying heavily on 
select comments made by Senator Bayh.145 
The court conceded that while past statements of a single senator can hardly 
suffice to provide a comprehensive view of congressional intent, Senator Bayh’s 
position as the sponsor and author of the statute carried considerable weight.146  
The difficult reality is that Congress did not debate the scope of Title IX at any 
length, thus, Senator Bayh’s comments on the topic carry a high degree of 
significance.147  Still, upon further review of the Congressional Record, Senator 
Bayh’s statements indicate that Congress envisioned Title IX as an expansive 
remedy that would address extensive discrimination at educational institutions.148 
Contrary to Doe’s assertions, Senator Bayh’s comments do not support the 
 
144.  Compare Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 564 (“This is a case containing very serious 
allegations of student conduct on a college campus in Rhode Island.  Nevertheless, laws put 
into place to protect students from sexual discrimination in educational programs were not 
meant to address all instances of sexual assault occurring in the college environment . . . legal 
precedent allowing for a private right of action for damages is limited to certain situations.”), 
with Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708 (“Since the Civil War, the Federal Government and the federal 
courts have been the primary and powerful reliances in protecting citizens against [invidious] 
discrimination [including that on the basis of sex].”) (internal quotations omitted).  The Supreme 
Court in Cannon set forth a position that the federal court system acts as a barrier between 
individuals and institutions who might subject them to discrimination.  See id.  In declining to 
extend Title IX protection to victims of sex discrimination, merely because of their enrollment 
status, the District Court of Rhode Island did not follow the custodial principle proffered by the 
Supreme Court in Cannon.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 564 (finding Jane Doe’s complaint not 
among scenarios where Title IX protection applies). 
145.  Compare Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561-62 (interpreting only statements made by 
Senator Bayh during debate about Title IX’s passage and relying almost exclusively on Davis, 
Gebser, and Bell cases), with Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694. (“Far from evidencing any purpose to 
deny a private cause of action, the history of Title IX rather plainly indicates that Congress 
intended to create such a remedy.”).  In Cannon, the Court began its dive into the history of 
Title IX by first noting that its statutory language was intentionally patterned after Title VI—
and that “the drafters of Title VI explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as 
Title VI had been.”  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694–96.  The similarities between these Title IX 
and Title VI is, in part, what led the Court to introduce an implied right of action under Title 
IX, as one existed under Title VI.  See id. at 699–703.  Finally, the Court discussed the 
legislative intent behind Title IX by detailing statements made about the purposes of the act 
during the Congressional debates surrounding its passage.  See id. at 703–08. 
146.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (identifying Senator Bayh as important source 
because he was the primary author and sponsor of Title IX in Senate), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st 
Cir. 2018).  The District Court did not elaborate on why it gave significant weight to Senator 
Bayh’s comments, other than to say, “Senator Bayh’s remarks, as those of the sponsor and 
author of the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute’s 
construction.”  See id. 
147.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694, n.16, 696, n.19; 701, n.30 (showing that Supreme 
Court heavily relied on Senator Bayh’s comments in determining purposes behind Title IX). 
148.  See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (“[The Amendment] is broad, but basically it 
closes loopholes in existing legislation. . . .”).  Congress issued such expansive language 
because, according to Senator Bayh, sex discrimination had reached into so many facets of 
women’s lives that the only appropriate “antidote” to the problem was a comprehensive 
amendment.  See id. at 5804. (“It is difficult to indicate the full extent of discrimination against 
women today.”). 
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exclusion of persons from Title IX protection based on enrollment status.149  In 
fact, on several occasions, Senator Bayh referred to Title IX in a manner that 
implied its broad application: “[A] strong and comprehensive measure is needed 
to provide women with solid legal protection from the persistent, pernicious 
discrimination which is serving to perpetuate second-class citizenship in 
America.”150  This statement is one of several instances in the Congressional 
Record where Senator Bayh impresses the point that Title IX was intentionally 
drafted with broad language so it could be construed liberally.151  This 
pronouncement, and others made by Senator Bayh, demonstrate an intent to 
protect all persons, particularly women but not exclusively students, from 
educational institutions that employ harmful discriminatory practices.152 
 
149.  See id. at 5807 (“The amendment is designed to expand some of our basic civil 
rights and labor laws to prohibit the discrimination against women which was been so 
thoroughly documented.”).  Importantly, though the proposed language of Title IX directs that 
no “person” in the United States shall be subject to discrimination on the basis of sex, Senator 
Bayh refers constantly to the plight of American “women” in 1970 who sought to advance their 
educational and employment opportunities.  See id.  Though not explicitly, Senator Bayh 
interpreted the term “person” as the functional equivalent of the term “woman.”  See id.  The 
implicit meaning behind Senator Bayh’s use of the word “person” is particularly instructive in 
the disagreement between Jane Doe and the District Court of Rhode Island over the 
interpretation of the word “person.”  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562.  Senator Bayh’s use of 
the word person also reflects that the term’s intended class of claimants has changed over time.  
Compare 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (demonstrating Senator Bayh’s use of the word 
“women” to denote intended class persons entitled to Title IX protection), with Doe, 270 F. 
Supp. 3d at 558 (setting forth Jane Doe’s belief that “person” should include “persons 
experiencing gender discrimination who are not students or staff at the offending school.”).  For 
further discussion of the parties’ respective arguments regarding the interpretation of the word 
“person” in the context of Title IX, see supra notes 114–31.  When Cannon first introduced a 
private right of action under Title IX, the Supreme Court neither stated nor implied that the right 
to bring a claim hinged on plaintiff’s status as a student.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709.  In fact, 
the Court in Cannon introduced a private right of action to provide relief to a nonstudent who 
was denied admission to an educational institution.  See id. at 680.  Admittedly, Cannon did not 
contemplate Title IX’s modern applicability to sexual harassment and assault, and therefore is 
not the controlling precedent for peer-harassment suits.  See id.  Still, the court’s statutory 
interpretation of the purposes underlying Title IX is instructive.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d 559–
61 (citing Cannon in analysis of decision on four separate occasions).  Furthermore, though the 
Supreme Court emphasized the “program-specific nature of Title IX” in Bell, the Court still 
noted that, “If we are to give Title IX the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep 
as broad as its language.”  See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982).  This 
language implies, as in Cannon, that Title IX and its statutory language, including the word 
“person,” should be construed generally and without significant limitations.  See generally id. 
(advocating for a more inclusive interpretation of the word “person” in Title IX’s statutory 
language).  
150.  See 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement by Senator Bayh). 
151.  See, e.g., id. at 5803, 5804, 5807, 5808 (providing several statements by Senator 
Bayh during debate on Title IX’s passage, in which he advocated for comprehensive protection 
against discrimination by educational institutions).  
152.  See id. at 5808 (concluding that impact of Title IX is meant to be far-reaching and 
functional).  In closing his presentation of Title IX to the Senate floor, Senator Bayh noted the 
relevant legislative history and important social backdrop behind the drafting of the Act: 
[The] simple, if unpleasant, truth is that we still do not have in law the essential 
guarantees of equal opportunity in education for men and women.  When I proposed 
an amendment similar to this last August it was ruled ‘nongermane.’  Now I am 
coming back to the Senate with this comprehensive approach . . . .  
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As both the Supreme Court in Cannon and Senator Bayh’s comments 
articulate, the overall purpose of Title IX is to deter gender-based discrimination 
and create a nonhostile educational environment that offers opportunities and 
benefits for all persons who come into contact with educational institutions.153  If 
a nonstudent is denied the ability to seek a remedy against an institution that failed 
to investigate, adjudicate, or report a sexually heinous incident, then Title IX 
cannot accomplish the broad custodial objective Congress sought in its passage 
of the Act.154  By precluding nonstudents from the class of persons able to recover 
under Title IX in Doe, the District of Rhode Island failed to provide adequate 
shelter from unjust and biased institutional procedures.155 
Not only did the District Court of Rhode Island’s holding in Doe fail to 
adhere to the integrity and purpose of Title IX, but in reaching that holding it also 
failed to adequately apply the Supreme Court’s peer-harassment analysis 
prescribed in Davis.156  Davis is undoubtedly the controlling precedent for 
evaluating peer-harassment claims, but the District Court of Rhode Island 
required Doe to allege her status as an enrolled student, an element not explicitly 
articulated in Davis.157  In contrast to the District Court of Rhode Island’s 
inconsistent judicial interpretation, the Eighth Circuit properly applied the test 
from Davis in K.T.158  The court’s silence on nonstudent standing not only 
 
Id. 
153.  See id. (stating protection against discrimination by educational institutions must 
be extensive); see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 (describing the second purpose of Title IX as, 
“to provide individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory] practices.”); 20 
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018) (establishing that no “person” be subject to discrimination on basis of 
sex). 
154.  Cf. 118 CONG. REC. 5803–08 (expressing sentiments by Senator Bayh, in which he 
stated Title IX could provide protection against widespread discrimination by educational 
institutions, particularly for women).  
155.  See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 564 (D.R.I. 2017) (denying Jane 
Doe private method of recovery under Title IX and acknowledging her only recourse for Brown 
University’s deliberate indifference was pending administrative complaint), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 
(1st Cir. 2018).   
156.  See id. at 560 (“The elements a plaintiff must prove assume that Ms. Doe meets the 
most basic criteria of a Title IX claimant, that she is part of a class of persons entitled to Title 
IX protection.”).  The District Court of Rhode Island cited several cases that acknowledge only 
students and employees as claimants.  See id.  In a string cite, the court identified Frazier, in 
which the First Circuit held a plaintiff must allege that they are a student in order to proceed 
with a private right of action under Title IX.  See id.  (citing Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 
276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002)). There exists tension, then, not only between the First Circuit 
and the Supreme Court’s requisite elements for peer-harassment claims, but also within the First 
Circuit itself.  See id. at 561 (examining Title IX plaintiff’s enrollment status as threshold matter 
related to standing).  But see Frazier, 276 F.3d at 66 (incorporating Title IX plaintiff’s 
enrollment status as element of Davis test).  The District Court of Rhode Island treated the 
problem of Doe’s nonstudent status as a threshold issue rather than evaluating the merits of 
Doe’s claim.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 561. 
157.  See id. (explaining that inferences from federal case law, particularly Davis, support 
limiting peer-harassment claims to students only).  In Davis, the Court never explicitly required 
a plaintiff to be a student in order to bring a Title IX claim, but the District Court of Rhode 
Island reasoned that the Supreme Court’s continuous reference back to the school’s own 
students highlighted its intention to apply a private right of action under Title IX only to 
students.  See id. 
158.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (8th Cir. 2017) 
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followed precedent but also contemplated the underlying purpose of a private 
Title IX action.159 
B. Tornado Warning: The Dangers of Doe v. Brown University 
The K.T. court’s application of Davis to a nonstudent Title IX claim reflects 
more than mere compliance with federal precedent.160  The legislative history and 
judicial interpretation of Title IX discussed in this Note demonstrates that the 
purpose of providing a private right of action under Title IX is to protect 
individuals from an educational institution’s discriminatory practices.161  The 
Eighth Circuit did not address whether nonstudents have standing to recover 
under Title IX, leaving a sliver of hope for nonstudent-plaintiffs who seek to bring 
claims.162  The unfortunate reality, however, is that even if nonstudents did have 
standing, the high standard of the Davis test makes it incredibly difficult for a 
nonstudent-plaintiff to prove the requisite elements successfully.163  Still, K.T.’s 
refusal to definitively settle on the issue of nonstudent standing leaves open a 
window, albeit a narrow one, of recovery for nonstudent-plaintiffs.164 
The blanket preclusion in Doe blindly removes a private remedy under Title 
IX from nonstudent-plaintiffs, regardless of any distinguishing facts that might 
sustain a peer-harassment claim; it wields Davis against nonstudents like a blunt 
instrument.165  The Eighth Circuit approached the claim in K.T. by holding that 
 
(applying Davis to K.T.’s Title IX claim). 
159.  See generally id. (demonstrating that evaluating nonstudent’s peer-harassment 
claim expands Title IX protection).  As stated repeatedly in this Note, a private right of action 
was implied by the text of Title IX to carry out the purpose of protecting individuals from 
discriminatory practices.  For a discussion of the legislative purposes identified in Cannon and 
comments made by Senator Bayh regarding the expensive application of Title IX, see supra 
notes 55–62, 143–55 and accompanying text. 
160.  For a discussion of how the Eighth Circuit’s holding in K.T. implicates an expansion 
of the class of persons able to bring private claims under Title IX for peer harassment see infra 
notes 162–73 and accompanying text. 
161.  For a discussion of the protective, custodial purpose behind the allowance of private 
Title IX remedies, see supra notes 139–59 and accompanying text. 
162.  See K.T., 865 F.3d at 1056–57 (deciding to ignore the question of nonstudent-
plaintiff standing).  It is important to note that the Eighth Circuit was fully aware of the legal 
reasoning previously employed in K.T. by the Eastern District of Missouri.  See id.  The Eighth 
Circuit very well could have agreed with the Eastern District and concluded that a nonstudent 
cannot, as a matter of law, bring a Title IX claim against an educational institution they do not 
attend.  See id. at 1056.  Instead of precluding all nonstudents from bringing Title IX claims at 
the outset, the Eighth Circuit made a conscious decision to review the plaintiff’s complaint on 
the merits.  See id. at 1057.  The court ultimately found that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to 
state a claim of peer harassment under Title IX, but it never revisited the issue of nonstudent 
standing.  See id. at 1059. 
163.  For a discussion on how the plaintiff in K.T. lost her peer-harassment claim under 
Title IX on the merits, see supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on the 
high standard established by the Supreme Court in Davis, see supra notes 69–84. 
164.  See infra notes 166–71 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the Eighth 
Circuit’s holding in K.T. may permit recovery for nonstudents. 
165.  See Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 564 (D.R.I. 2017) (issuing a general 
preclusion of nonstudent Title IX claims), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).  Instead of noting 
Title IX’s historically expansive application and judicial interpretation, the District Court of 
Rhode Island decided to issue a blanket denial of recourse to nonstudents under Title IX: 
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the nonstudent-plaintiff did not satisfy an element of the Davis test, rather than 
deciding on the issue of nonstudent standing.166  The school had no prior basis 
for anticipating the sexual harassment, and because a school’s deliberate 
indifference to actual knowledge of discrimination is necessary to bring a claim, 
the suit could not stand.167  Although the Eighth Circuit chose to avoid the 
question of nonstudent standing in K.T., the case is an example of how 
nonstudents could possibly bring a claim if they are allowed to demonstrate the 
standards proffered by Davis.168 
For instance, if a student with a record of sexual misconduct assaulted a 
nonstudent, and the nonstudent could show that the educational institution had 
prior knowledge of that student’s conduct and failed to address the allegations in 
a manner that could have prevented a future assault, then the nonstudent could 
potentially establish the actual knowledge and deliberate indifference elements 
under Davis.169  Even in these limited circumstances, nonstudents would struggle 
to recover because of the difficulty in demonstrating the final element: the 
misconduct was so pervasive, severe, and offensive that it substantially affected 
their ability to receive an education at an institution they do not attend.170  So, had 
 
“[L]aws put into place to protect students from sexual discrimination in educational programs 
were not meant to address all instances of sexual assault occurring in the college environment.”  
Id.  For a further discussion of the District Court of Rhode Island’s reasoning and holding in 
Doe, see supra notes 119–38 and accompanying text. 
166.  See K.T., 865 F.3d at 1057. (avoiding question of nonstudent-plaintiff standing in 
Title IX cases instead addressing question of whether K.T. stated plausible claim for violation 
of Title IX). 
167.  See id. at 1057–58 (noting that school’s deliberate indifference must subject 
students to alleged suffered harassment, of which school must have had actual knowledge, in 
order for claim to stand).  
168.  Cf. id. (engaging in Davis peer-harassment analysis).  Because the Eighth Circuit 
chose to address the plaintiff’s claims on the merits rather than preclude her from bringing a 
claim based solely upon her nonstudent status, it is still possible that a nonstudent may plead 
the requisite elements of a peer-harassment claim in the Eighth Circuit and potentially recover 
from an educational institution.  Cf. id. 
169.  For a discussion of the elements and practical application of the Davis decision, see 
supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text.  Nonstudents would likely be able to recover only 
if the student who harassed them was a known and recorded serial harasser.  See K.T., 865 F.3d 
at 1058 (noting that harassment committed by the same perpetrator can establish actual 
knowledge).  Such knowledge might only exist when the student has been reported to the school 
by other survivors, establishing a sufficient record of offensive conduct to demonstrate actual 
before-the-fact knowledge of the discriminatory conduct.  See id. at 1059 (“K.T.’s complaint is 
limited to an allegation of a single sexual assault. . .  K.T.’s singular grievance on its own does 
not plausibly allege pervasive discrimination as required to state a peer harassment claim.”); 
see also Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (suggesting actual knowledge 
can be established by recipient’s prior knowledge of (1) harassment committed by same 
offending student or (2) previous reports of sexual harassment occurring on the same premises). 
170.  See Walker supra note 2, at 110 (noting difficulty of holding institutions liable in 
light of requirement that alleged harassment was “severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive”).  Walker also noted that lower courts have routinely disposed of Title IX suits on 
the ground that the alleged harassment did not amount to the high standard articulated in Davis, 
and that in general, Title IX claims rarely survive the pre-trial motion stage of litigation.  See 
id. at 127–28.  The Davis test practically “immunizes” schools from liability in Title IX suits, 
and seriously cripples the possibility for successful non-student complaints, even more so than 
it already cripples enrolled student complaints.  See id. at 99.  Nevertheless, the high burden 
may stymie criticism by those who think allowing nonstudents to bring suit under Title IX 
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the court in Doe avoided the issue of nonstudent standing like the court in K.T., 
the extent of Title IX’s shelter still would have been minimal.171 
Nonetheless, allowing nonstudents to bring suit under Title IX better honors 
and reflects the underlying purpose of the Act rather than a blanket preclusion of 
nonstudent-plaintiff claims, like the one issued in Doe.172  Under Doe, even if a 
nonstudent could prove the requisite elements of the Davis test, a nonstudent 
could not bring a Title IX claim in the District Court of Rhode Island.173  This 
holding gives colleges and universities both leash and license to negligently 
investigate claims, as well as leniently discipline their students when they assault 
nonstudents.174  Because there is no looming threat of private suit, there is little 
incentive for schools to remedy their Title IX response procedures for 
nonstudents.175 
Without a federal mandate to respond to nonstudent assaults, schools 
 
would expose colleges and universities to unprecedented liability.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton 
Coll., No. 4:16-CV-165 CAS, 2016 WL 4243965 at *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2016) (arguing that 
expansion of plaintiff class would impermissibly expand the scope of Title IX).  This is also 
where the unique facts of Doe are instructive, and the highly interconnected nature of American 
universities becomes relevant.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 558–59 (arguing alleged sexual 
assault caused plaintiff to drop out because of close proximity of Providence College and Brown 
University).  For a discussion of how colleges and nonstudent communities are both related and 
intertwined see supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text.  Doe argued that because the schools 
were located in close proximity, she reasonably feared for her safety in the surrounding area 
after Brown failed to discipline her alleged attackers; this fear resulted in a hostile educational 
environment at her nearby school, Providence College.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp 3d at 558–59.  
Although a discussion advocating for the expansion of the Davis test—specifically, the 
expansion of the “objectively offensive conduct” prong—is outside the scope of this Note, 
future judicial interpretation might consider expanding Title IX’s reach to protect where the 
substantial effects of harassment are felt, not just where the harassment occurred.  See, e.g., id. 
(acknowledging Jane Doe’s education was affected, but that education was provided by 
Providence College, not Brown University). 
171.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. at 564. (acknowledging at end of Doe opinion that 
ramifications of decision would allow schools to act, or continue to act, with deliberate 
indifference to reports of sexual misconduct committed against nonstudents).  Still, despite the 
dangerous implications of the Doe decision on nonstudents, it would be difficult for nonstudents 
to show that they were deprived of an educational program they had no access to in the first 
instance.  See, e.g., K.T., 865 F.3d at 1059 (stating single incident of sexual misconduct could 
not have had “systemic effect” on K.T.’s education at school she did not attend). 
172.  Compare id. at 1057 (overlooking issue of nonstudent standing for Title IX claims, 
thereby leaving open possibility for nonstudent to bring claim according to Davis test), with 
Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (categorically excluding nonstudents from private right of action 
under Title IX, even if allegations of noncompliance are accepted by court as true). 
173.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (deciding court need go no further in analysis of 
Title IX claim if plaintiff is nonstudent). 
174.  See id. at 558 (“In 2016, after Ms. Doe’s repeated inquiries with appropriate persons 
at Brown, Brown informed her that it never completed the inquiry concerning her assault an 
abandoned any disciplinary action against the three Brown students.”). 
175.  See id. at 564 (pointing out OCR complaint filed by Doe still pending at time of 
suit, which could force Brown University to face penalties).  The District Court of Rhode Island, 
in denying Doe’s private Title IX claim, also pointed out that an administrative remedy still 
exists: “Title IX is an administrative enforcement statute and contains directives to ensure that 
schools comply with its mandate against discrimination in education through funding 
restrictions.”  Id.  For a further discussion of why Title IX plaintiffs prefer bringing private 
actions rather than relying on administrative remedies, see supra notes 49–62 and 
accompanying text. 
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endanger the safety of campus visitors as well as other enrolled students.176  If 
nonstudents lack a private method of accountability to pressure educational 
institutions to investigate these claims under Title IX, predatory students may be 
permitted to continue their behavior against nonstudents without discipline.177  
Nonstudents should have standing to bring a claim under Title IX to more 
effectively protect against discriminatory behavior perpetrated by both students 
and educational institutions.178  If confronted with similar facts to those in Doe 
and K.T., courts should allow nonstudent-plaintiffs to demonstrate—and 
satisfy—the elements required by Davis, rather than issuing a blanket 
preclusion.179 
VI. THE SUN WON’T COME OUT TOMORROW: THE IMPACT OF DOE v. BROWN 
UNIVERSITY 
Although the aftershocks of the Doe decision are currently limited to the 
First Circuit, the practical consequences of this decision on student safety and 
institutional responsibility should cause widespread concern.180  It is likely 
federal courts across the United States will continue to encounter Title IX cases 
with nonstudent-plaintiffs; the interconnected nature of college campuses and 
current social climate almost guarantees it.181  Nonstudents are still vulnerable to 
sexual assault and harassment from students at educational institutions even if 
they are not enrolled at or employed by those institutions.182  If a school does not 
 
176.  For further discussion of the underlying purposes of Title IX, see supra notes 55–
62, 139–59 and accompanying text. 
177.  See Doe, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (explaining students who allegedly assaulted Jane 
Doe did not face discipline, despite Jane Doe’s repeated efforts to pressure Brown University 
to complete inquiry into sexual misconduct incident).  As evidenced in the Doe case, Brown 
University did not feel obligated to respond to a nonstudent Title IX complaint; a lack of private 
enforcement meant there was no way for Jane Doe to ensure that the students who assaulted her 
suffered consequences.  See id.  For a further discussion of Brown University’s refusal to take 
action against Doe’s alleged attackers, see supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
178.  For a critical analysis of K.T. and further discussion of how the Eight Circuit’s 
refusal to outright deny standing to nonstudents implicitly allows nonstudents to bring private 
Title IX suits, see supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text. 
179.  See K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (allowing 
private Title IX suit for nonstudents so long as Davis requirements are satisfied); see also supra 
notes 160–78 and accompanying text for this Note’s advocacy for allowing standing for 
nonstudents over the reasoning employed in Doe. 
180.  See Thacker, supra note 11, at 701 (noting that educational institutions have 
custodial and tutelary powers); see also supra notes 13–19 for information regarding 
nonstudents’ relation to colleges and universities, specifically the number of visitors on college 
campuses, the public nature of higher education, and the effect of educational institutions on 
surrounding communities. 
181.  For a comprehensive review of the current socio-political climate surrounding 
recent uproar over high-profile sexual misconduct allegations see supra notes 2–12.  For a 
discussion of the uniquely public nature of American colleges and universities, and the 
implications of permeable campus borders. see supra notes 13–19. 
182.  See, e.g., K.T., 865 F.3d at 1056 (addressing complaint brought by nonstudent-
plaintiff who was assaulted by enrolled student after visiting campus and attending party); Doe, 
270 F. Supp. 3d at 563–64 (addressing complaint brought by nonstudent-plaintiff who was 
assaulted by enrolled student on campus after meeting enrolled student at local bar). 
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administer proper Title IX procedures to a nonstudent sexual misconduct 
complaint, under Doe there is no impending threat of legal recourse, and 
therefore, little incentive for schools to amend their Title IX response protocol.183  
An educational institution’s unwillingness to administer its Title IX policy to 
nonstudents is particularly problematic given the severely underreported nature 
of sexual offenses, especially on college campuses, where incidents of sexual 
misconduct also occur in high concentration.184 
Even if a nonstudent does step forward to report an incident to a school, a 
school’s failure to respond to that report can have harmful ramifications on other 
students or employees if the same offender later repeats sexual misconduct.185  A 
lack of private enforcement for nonstudents means there is no way to ensure 
educational institutions follow through with Title IX protocol, unless that 
nonstudent files a complaint with OCR.186  In dismissing nonstudent Title IX 
claims, educational institutions may very well  generate the hostile educational 
environments Title IX was intended to remedy.187  The current interpretation of 
 
183.  See Kelley Taylor, Evaluating the Varied Impacts of Title IX, INSIGHT INTO 
DIVERSITY WEBSITE (July 5, 2016), https://www.insightintodiversity.com/evaluating-the-
varied-impacts-of-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/H5TP-F7PJ] (“[S]ince Title IX was passed, no 
school has lost federal funds due to a violation of the statute. . . federal funding has reportedly 
been made conditional on institutions remedying identified problems through resolution 
agreements with the OCR.”).  As Taylor noted, of the two original enforcement mechanisms 
under Title IX—OCR administrative complaints and private legal suits—the OCR method of 
enforcement is feeble.  See id.  As a result, the only remaining method of accountability is to 
bring a legal claim as a Title IX plaintiff.  Cf. id. 
184.  See Fast Facts College Crime, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS 
(NCES), https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=804 [https://perma.cc/2GBB-R8CQ] (last 
visited May 4, 2019) (finding out of 27,500 on-campus criminal incidents reported to police 
and security in 2015, 8,000 were forcible sex offenses.); Sexual Assault Statistics, NATIONAL 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR. (NSVRC), https://www.nsvrc.org/statistics 
[https://perma.cc/2896-HF29] (last visited May 4, 2019) (showing sexual assault is most 
underreported crime, with approximately 63% of sexual assaults projected to be unreported).  
Furthermore, the NSVRC estimated that more than 90% of sexual assaults on college campuses 
go unreported.  See Sexual Assault Statistics, supra.    
185.  See David Lasiak & Paul Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among 
Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 73, 78 (2002) (finding out of 2,000 men that 
were polled, 120 men self-reported acts constituting the legal definition of rape or attempted 
rape, and 76 reported committing repeat rapes).  As demonstrated by these statistics, it is not 
uncommon for rapists to commit multiple offenses.  See id.  If schools do not investigate sexual 
assault claims made by nonstudents, then it is possible repeat offenders may go uninvestigated, 
undisciplined, and as a result, can offend again.  See Sarah Silverhardt, Giving Serial Rapists a 
Permanent Mark on Campus, JURIST (Aug. 30, 2017, 12:54 PM), 
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2017/08/sarah-silverhardt-college-campuses-serial-rapists/ 
[https://perma.cc/4DXD-HKAF] (“Under Title IX, two particular flaws significantly contribute 
to the continuous serial rape problem.”).  According to Silverhardt, the first flaw is “non-existent 
information sharing [about known sexual offenders] between post-secondary campuses.”  See 
id.  The second flaw is “the lenient punishment implemented by the schools for Title IX 
violations. . . such as sensitivity training, book report assignments or probation from 
extracurricular activities. . .  The most severe punishment is expulsion, which is uncommon, 
and at some schools, nonexistent.”  See id. 
186.  For explanation of why an OCR complaint is an inadequate administrative remedy, 
and the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision to introduced a private right of action 
under Title IX in Cannon, see supra notes 46–62 and accompanying text. 
187.  See 118 CONG. REC. 5803–08 (1972) (describing severe degree of hostile sex 
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the statute insulates a culture of complicity among people who have the power 
and responsibility to protect the community—not just their own students or 
employees.188  Aside from leaving visitors vulnerable to harassment and assault 
on college campuses, Doe takes away the most powerful legal mode of recourse 








discrimination within educational institutions and need for comprehensive reform via passage 
of Title IX).  For discussion regarding the health and safety impacts in dismissing nonstudent-
plaintiff Title IX claims see supra notes 180–86. 
188.  See, e.g., Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 563–64 (D.R.I. 2017) 
(explaining Brown University continually ignored Jane Doe’s inquiries into pending sexual 
misconduct complaint at school, and once investigation was finally intiated, did not comply 
with Title IX standards), aff’d, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018); id. at 564 (conceding that holding 
in present case would allow deliberately indifferent school administrators to escape 
accountability by nonstudents). 
189.  See id. at 563–64 (dismissing Doe’s state law claims under Rhode Island Civil 
Rights Act and Rhode Island Constitution).  Title IX is a substantial federal resource for victims 
of sex discrimination; it is codified within the 1972 Educational Amendment to the Civil Right 
Acts and provides not only an administrative mode of recovery, but also an implied private 
cause of action that can be invoked by individuals against massive educational institutions.  See 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694–70 (1979) (explaining legislative history and legal 
power of Title IX, in addition to emphasizing importance of offering private remedy so as to 
effect Title IX’s statutory purpose). 
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